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I. INTRODUCTION
This Paper critically examines the claim that least developed countries
(LDCs) must enact, implement, and enforce strong protections of intellectual
property rights (IPR) as a precondition to attracting foreign direct investment
(FDI).' The relationship between strong lP protection and greater attraction
of FDI is a somewhat new justification for strengthening patent protection. 2
The traditional justification was that there is a causal relationship between
strong IP protection and innovation.
In other words, the traditional
justification argued that strong IP protection incentivizes the creative impulse
and therefore spurs technological innovation. 3 This claim holds true for
middle-income economies.4
' See generally Hitoshi Tanaka & Tatsuro Iwaisako, IntellectualPropertyRights and Foreign
Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis, 67 EuR. ECON. REv. 107-24 (2014) (using a dynamic
general equilibrium model to show that strengthening IPR protection increases innovation in the
North and the flow of FDI from North to South in both the long and short run); Emmanuel
Hassan, Ohid Yaqub & Stephanie Diepeveen, IntellectualPropertyand Developing Countries:A
Review of the Literature, RAND Europe Technical Report (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/technical reports/201O/RAND TR804.pdf (arguing that disaggregated data on
FDI and trade shows that "stronger IPRs seem to encourage FDI in production and R&D rather
than in sales and distribution"); see also Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,Developing
Countries, and the Doha "Solution, " 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 65-66 (2002) (arguing strong IP
protection would benefit developing countries in the aggregate because firms with protected IP
would be incentivized to produce IP goods of importance to these countries).
2 By strength in IP protection, I refer to the heightened levels of IP protection in the TRIPS
Agreement relative to the weak protections of countervailing public interests. As a result, the
protection of IP rights makes it difficult to balance between access and exclusion to IP
protected products, which in turn exacerbates the gap between wealth and inequality within
LDCs. I discuss those heightened protections of IP rights in Part III.C, infra. Strength in IP
protection is measured by the adoption of national laws implementing international
intellectual property treaties such as the TRIPS Agreement, a broad range of coverage of IP
rights, a high level of enforcement of a country's IP laws, and the absence of restrictions on
those rights. In general terms, strong IP protection refers to the protection of IP rights as
exclusive rights, often without balancing such protection with other interests. For more on
this, see generally Walter G. Park & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Technology Transfer and the
Economic Implications of the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing
Countries(OECD Trade Policy, Working Paper No. 62 (2008)).
See Robert P. Terrill, Cartels and the InternationalExchange of Technology, 36 AM.
EcoN. REv. 745, 757 (1946) (arguing that "[t]he numerous patent jurisdictions of the world
form an interrelated system whose reason for existence, from the standpoint of the world
economy, is to promote invention and assist in the wide dissemination of technology and its
prompt utilization in industrial improvements"). See also EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 131 (1951).

4 See Keith Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual PropertyRights in Asia: Implicationsfor
Australia, 37 AUSTL. EcoN. PAPERS 346, 346-51, 354-57 (1998).
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However, unlike with higher-income developing countries, the traditional
justification may not hold up for LDCs.' This is because innovative capacity
in LDCs does not solely depend on strengthened IP protection.6 Elsewhere, I
have set forth in greater detail the steps that resource rich, low-income
countries can take to spur greater technological innovation in their
economies.' The goal of this Paper is therefore primarily limited to
examining claims that link strong IP protection to increased FDI flows in
LDCs.
In examining claims of strengthened IP protection in developing countries
in general and LDCs in particular, I trace the agenda of strong IP global
protection by rich countries to the pre-Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement) era.' I show that for several decades,
industrialized countries have sought strong IP protections for their products.
Developing countries like nineteenth century France argued against strong
global IP regimes, because at the time they were viewed as a barrier to the
development of domestic industries. This trend continued into the late
1950s, when developing countries tried to diminish IP protection within the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention). When these developing countries failed, they tried to diminish
IP protections within the United Nations. Thus, in earlier periods there were
similar contests over the strength of IP protection as there are in the
contemporary period. These contests have been characterized by developing

&

s See infra Part II.A (defining developing countries and LDCs).
6 See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 471, 478 (2000) (identifying additional considerations regarding the nature
of technological development, such as resource availability and technical capacity). While I
do not pursue the argument in this Paper, there is a lot of creative activity in LDCs that falls
outside the ambit of western style IP regimes, in much the same way that many creative
endeavors in western countries are flourishing without strong intellectual property protection.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 1437 (2010)
(illustrating how many creative endeavors such as fashion, stand-up comedy, magic, cuisine,
and software have thrived without strong IP protections). But see Anupam Chander
Mandhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1331 (2004) (warning
that the romance of the public domain may undervalue the ability of non-Western property
claims such as those relating to genetic resources and traditional knowledge).
' See generally James Thuo Gathii, Beyond China's Human Rights Exceptionalism in
Africa: Leveraging Science, Technology and Engineeringfor Long-Term Growth, 51 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 644 (2013).
8 See analysis infra Part III.
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countries using forum shifting to seek the best place to stake their IP rights
claims.'
A discussion of the strength of IP protection in LDCs arose in November
2012 when Haiti-on behalf of all LDCs-filed a request under Article 66.1
of the TRIPS Agreement for an extension of the transition period within
which they must become TRIPS compliant.'o The Council for TRIPS
granted the request, and the transition period to apply the provisions of the
Agreement was extended to July 1, 2021." An exception was made for
pharmaceutical patents, which were initially required to come into
compliance in 2016, but now have until 2033 to become compliant.1 2 The
Haitian request for extension argued that in "view of the impossibility of
determining when individual LDCs will be able to overcome the constraints
that prevent them from creating a viable technological base, the transition
period should remain in force while the member is considered a least
developed country in the WTO."' 3 Despite the extension being granted, the
WTO has advocated for the view that there is a relationship between
strengthened IP protection and the flow of FDI. In its 2011 World Trade
Report titled The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Coexistence to Coherence, the WTO argued that IP ownership is one element
that provides a competitive advantage to multinational firms in international
markets and therefore Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) that provide for
the protection of lIP assets will encourage more FDI flow.14

' See James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IPR Law-Making and Enforcement
to InternationalInvestment Law, 18 MINN. J. L. Scl. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017).
10 Request for an Extension of the Transitional Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, Communication from Haiti on behalf of the LDC Group, IP/C/583 (Nov. 5, 2012),
available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/ldc e.htm [hereinafter Request for an
Extension].
" Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country
Members, IP/C/W/64 (June 12, 2013), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips
e/ldc e.htm [hereinafter Extension Decision].
12 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country
Members For Certain Obligations With Respect to PharmaceuticalProducts, IP/C/73 (Nov.
6, 2015), availableat https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/ldce.htm.
" See Request for an Extension, supra note 10, T 10. Paragraph 11 notes that the request
for extension of the transition period would last "as long as the WTO Member remains a least
developed country." Id ¶ 11.
14 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report - The WTO and preferential trade
agreements:From Co-existence to Coherence 137 (2011).
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I proceed as follows. First, because this Paper is primarily about least
developed countries, Part II begins by providing a definition of LDCs, as
well as discussing the current coverage of IP protection in these countries.
Part III traces the origins of strong IPR protection to the contentious debates
between industrialized and non-industrialized countries, and within the
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property from its founding in the late
nineteenth century through the twentieth century. This Part then shows the
continuity of this tension within the TRIPS Agreement. Part IV begins with
a review of literature discussing relationship between protection of IP rights
and innovation, development, and flow of FDI. This Part also examines the
overabundance of IP rights and economic gridlock, before examining some
historical evidence to establish whether or not strong IP protection is related
to industrialization and development in a number of countries. Part V then
briefly examines the current position of LDCs in relation to IP rights.
II. DEFINING LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) AND ESTABLISHING
CURRENT STATUS OF IP PROTECTION IN LDCs

A. What is an LDC?
The scholarly examination of IP protection in developing countries
seldom distinguishes between LDCs and developing countries." In my
view, failing to make this distinction-particularly in the context of
justifying strong IP protection as a prerequisite for increased FDI flows-is
problematic for at least two major reasons. First, LDC economies are at the
very fringe of the global economy. Since 1971, LDCs have been identified
as economies characterized by widespread poverty as well as "structural
weaknesses" in their economic, institutional and human resources.' 6 LDCs
are handicapped by extremely poor "human, physical and institutional
infrastructure ... [which frustrates their ability to take] advantage of

"1 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369

(2006), for an example of a recent examination of TRIPS in relation to developing countries
did not make this distinction clear.
16 These weaknesses are often compounded by geographical handicaps. For example, small
island LDC states that are isolated and have little land mass (some now subject to rising sea
levels); others are landlocked which impedes their ability to trade; others have hard to access
mineral resources which has provided militia groups with the ability to control their
exploitation.
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opportunities for sustained growth."" While these weaknesses certainly
justify the need for increased capital flows, it is unrealistic to assume that
merely strengthening IP protection in LDCs would result in increased capital
flows.
Second, LDCs are overwhelmingly agrarian and dependent on primary
commodities and mineral resources. These countries are the least equipped
to strengthen their IP regimes-they have severe technical capacity and
resource constraints, and extremely limited national budgets. They have
particularly pressing needs to holistically address their structural weaknesses
in welfare, productivity, and incomes. As such, investing in expensive IP
outfits, like modem patent examination offices, may not comport with
national priorities." Article XI, ¶ 2 of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization anticipates that LDCs do not have to necessarily assume
the same level of obligations as non-LDCs, providing that the "Least
Developed Countries recognized as such by the UN will only be required to
undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their
individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and
institutional capabilities."19
It is important to note that the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not
designate developing and least developed countries. 20 Rather, individual
countries announce whether they are developing or least developed. This

" U.N. Secretary-General, Compact for Inclusive Growth and Prosperity: Rep. of the
Secretary General's Eminent Persons Group on the Least Developed Countries, 10 (Mar. 28,
2011), http://www.un.org/en/conf/dc/pdf/epgreport032811_b_english-w-v2.pdf [hereinafter
Compact for Inclusive Growth and Prosperity].
1 LDCs are particularly vulnerable given that the gap between them and low- and middleincome countries was widening from 2001-2010. Compact for Inclusive Growth and
Prosperity, supra note 17, at 5. Developing countries, particularly those categorized as highand middle-income countries, would have more flexibility to adopt modem IP regimes. See
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing
Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1115, 1182 (2009) (arguing that high- and
middle-income developing countries "are well positioned to undertake a leadership role in
adapting traditional intellectual property law to the new technological conditions and
challenges that the OECD countries have increasingly failed to address"); Cynthia M. Ho,
Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic IntellectualProperty Decisions,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 230 (2015) (noting that member countries under TRIPS are able
to define patentability criteria to minimize harm to social policies. India has done so by
barring from patentability new uses of known compounds). See also infra Part IV.
19 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XI, ¶ 2, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
20 Article XI, 12 of the Marrakesh Agreement adopts the U.N.'s designation of a country as
an LDC for WTO purposes. Id.
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designation is primarily income-based-the U.N. Economic and Social
Council defines least developed countries as being characterized by three
elements: low gross national income, weak human assets, and economic
vulnerability to external shocks.21 In terms of income, a country is
considered least developed if it has a three-year average gross national
income per capita 22 of less than $992 USD, is characterized by negative real
per capita income growth, and a population of less than 75 million.2 3 In
effect, the majority of people in LDCs live in gross poverty.
A weak stock of human assets is the second criteria. A composite of the
following factors are taken into account: nutrition, health, and education.
Nutrition is measured by the average caloric consumption per capita by the
percentage of minimum dietary requirements. On this measure a majority of
people in least developed economies receive less than the minimum dietary
energy requirements. In assessing the second factor, health, analysis will
consider child mortality and prevalence of disease. LDCs exhibit a high
mortality rate for children under five. Further, there are high incidents of
diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria in these countries. Education is the
third factor analyzed to determine strength of human assets. Education is
measured by adult literacy. Adult literacy in LDCs is low, due to low
enrollment in primary, secondary, and high school.
Economic vulnerability is the third criteria for establishing that a country
is an LDC. Economic vulnerability is measured by merchandise export
concentration, instability in export earnings, instability of agricultural
production, an especially low share of manufacturing and modern services in
the Gross Domestic Product, and often a significant percentage of population
displacement attributable to natural disasters. Based on the foregoing
criteria, as of January 2015, forty-eight countries were listed as LDCs.

2 See U.N. Economic and Social Council, Comm. for Dev. Policy, Rep. on the 16th Sess.,
Mar. 24-28, 2014, TT 34-59 U.N. Doc. E/2014/33, Supp. No. 13 (2014), available at http://
www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdpecosoc/E_2014_33_en.pdf (explaining the
criteria and application of the criteria for the identification of least developed countries); U.N.
Office of High Representative for Least Developed Countries (UN-OHRLLS), Criteriafor
Identification and Graduation of LDCs, http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/
[hereinafter Criteriafor Identification].
22 Gross National Income is the sum of a country's gross domestic product (GDP) and net
income (labor compensation and property income) from abroad. See U.N. Statistics Division,
National Accounts, availableat http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/glossresults.asp?glD=8.
23 Criteriafor Identi/ication, supra note 21.
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Africa has thirty-four LDCs, the Asian Pacific region has thirteen, and Latin
America has one.24
The U.N. began focusing on the vulnerability of LDCs in the 1960s. 2 5
The First U.N. Conference on the LDCs was held in Paris in 1981. It
adopted a comprehensive Substantial New Programme of Action for the
1980s for the Least Developed Countries (SNPA). 2 6 Subsequent conferences
were held throughout the decade, whereupon the SNPA gained the
endorsement of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social
Council. 27 The Fourth U.N. Conference on the LDCs was held in Istanbul in
May 2011, and resulted in the promulgation of the Istanbul Plan of Action
(IPoA) and the Istanbul Declaration. 28 Neither JPoA nor the Istanbul
Declaration note that strengthening IP rights will enable half of the current
LDCs to meet the criteria for graduation from LDC status by 2020.29
Instead, both emphasize that creating a productive base, such as through
technological capability, should be an important priority for LDCs.
B. CurrentStatus ofIP Protectionin LDCs
Different countries, and particularly LDCs, provide vastly different IP
protections. To determine the current status of IP laws in various LDCs, I
used information from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIIPO),
the World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Reports, and
(where available) information from individual countries. Many of these laws
24 See UN-OHRLLS, About LDCs, http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/. There is also a category
of thirty-seven low and lower-middle income countries that are not classified as LDCs. See
UN-DESA, Least Developed Countries: Country Resolutions and reports, http://www.un.org/
en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ ldc2/ldccountries.shtml (listing the list countries).
25 Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Brussels, Belg.,
May 14-20, Brussels Programme ofAction for the Least Developed Countriesfor the Decade

2001-2010, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 191/11 (May 20, 2001), available at http://www.un-docume
nts.netlacl91 -1 .htm.
26

Id

27

Id.

28 Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Istanbul, Turk.,

May 9-13, Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countriesfor the Decade 2001-

2010, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/11 (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.un-documents.
net/acl91-1 1.htm [hereinafter 2011-2020 Programme of Action].
29 See About LDCs, supra note 24. To be eligible for graduation from LDC status, a
country must meet the threshold for two out of the three criteria. Criteriafor Identification,
supra note 21. In turn, to actually qualify for graduation, the same country must meet two of
said criteria for two consecutive triennial reviews. Id Examples of countries that have
graduated from their LDC status include the Maldives, Samoa, and Cape Verde.
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predate the TRIPS Agreement. Perusing through the provisions, I found that
87.5% of all LDCs have legal protection for patents, 93.75% for copyrights,
91% for trademarks, and 37.5% for plant varieties.30 Since 1995-when
TRIPS came into effect for non-LDC countries-56.25% have passed new
patent laws, 58.33% copyright laws, 52.08% trademark laws, and 64.58%
plant varieties laws.3
It is clear from the foregoing data that LDCs have taken legislative steps
to protect IP rights. However, in many LDCs, these provisions are rarely
enforced, if ever. Many LDCs lack a dedicated IP office, and to the extent
that there is such an office, it is a small component of a larger governmental
body. Such an office often has few resources and expert personnel, and as
such is often engaged in lower-order tasks such as patent registrations of
foreign rather than local patents. 32 In essence, they are not engaged in
higher-order tasks like patent examination.
Without reliable data on what gains may be made by an LDC adopting a
modem IP legal and institutional regime, many LDCs may very well regard
strengthened IP regimes as a mechanism to protect the IP assets of developed
economies.3 3 WIPO has devoted considerable resources to assist LDCs build
IP capacity-including in technical advice, meetings, conferences and visits
by IP experts.34 In 2002, the World Bank estimated that it would cost an
LDC between $1.5 and $2 million in upfront costs to implement the TRIPS
Agreement. 35 Because fully implementing the TRIPS Agreement in an LDC
30 See infra APPENDIX Two.
31 See infra APPENDIX THREE.
32 See, e.g., Deema S. Jaafari, PharmaceuticalPatents in Jordan, 15 J. WORLD INTELL.

PROP. 239 (2012) (noting that of 973 patents published by Jordanian authorities during the
twenty years prior to 2012, 36% of them were pharmaceutical patents, and only 7% of these
came from domestic applicants). Notably, Jordan has a Patent Registration Section within its
Industrial Property Protection Directorate which is itself is a Department of the Ministry of
Industry and Trade. The Jordanian experience is typical of LDCs that have patent registration
offices as opposed to patent examination offices.
3 See Frederick Abbot, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in
CHRISTOPHE BELLMANN ET AL., TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON
TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 44 (2003).
34 CAROLYN DEERE-BIRBECK & RON MARCHANT, THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PRINCIPLES
OF THE WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 3-5 (2010).
31 See Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Basic Needs and Access to Medicines-Coming to

Grips with TRIPS: Conversion + Calculation,38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 520, 526 (2010) (citing
WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2002: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE WORLD'S

POOR 141 (2002)). One estimate found the amount China would need on annual basis to
administer and enforce a modem IP regime would be in excess of $10 million. Keith Maskus
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in China, in INTELLECTUAL
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is an expensive proposition, going beyond the TRIPS Agreement to further

strengthen IP rights would require evidence that the benefits to be gained
would outweigh the costs of implementing such reforms. The rest of this
Paper examines the evidence for and against such strengthened IP protection
in LDCs.
III. THE ORIGINS OF STRONG IPR PROTECTION

Support for strong IPR global protection is often traced to the TRIPS era.
However, that view is historically inaccurate. The origins of strong IP
protection date to before the TRIPS era. In this Part, I show two things:
First, that strong patent protection as adopted in the TRIPS Agreement
comes from a long history of U.S. support for the recognition of patents as
private property. This foreign policy view on patents has been espoused
since 1887, when the U.S. entered the Union for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Union).36 Second, the strong protection of IP rights that came to
be reflected in the Union's Paris Convention was opposed by nonindustrialized countries of the period. This history is symmetrical with the
way in which LDCs in the last few decades have sought to reduce the impact
the TRIPS Agreement has on them.
A. Tracing StrongIP Protectionto the ParisConvention
The original Article 5 of the Paris Convention provided that "importation
by the patentee into the country where the patent has been granted of objects
manufactured in any countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture.""
Edith Penrose, a French jurist and leading scholar of the Convention, has
argued that when Article Five was drafted in the 1880s, it was directed
against countries such as France, whose legislation barred importation of

PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT EcoNOMIc RESEARCH 303 (Keith

Maskus & Carsten Fink eds., 2005).
36 Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Re-Evaluation of the InternationalPatentConvention,
12 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 766 (1947). This view of patents as private property as
opposed to conceptualizing them as instruments of public policy was finally consolidated in
the TRIPS Agreement in 1994. TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, text reprinted in 33 1.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
3 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1888, 13 U.S.T. 2, as
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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products and processes through its national patent legislation." For France,
a relatively unindustrialized country at the time, it was in its interest to
condition the marketing privilege upon the patentee effectively working the
patent to prevent the French market from being used as an export platform
for products manufactured elsewhere. 9 This local working requirement
meant that a patented product or process had to be used or produced within
the patent granting country. The effect being that foreign patentees had to
situate their production facilities within the patent granting country.4 0
By conditioning the grant of foreign patents on a working requirement,
countries like France sought to preempt a regime of international protection
of patents that would frustrate the emergence of indigenous industries. As
Penrose argued:
The right of inventors and of industrial creators is an equitable
and useful creation of the civil law, which reconciles the rights
of inventors and of society by the concession of a temporary
monopoly. 41
Thus, the very claims being made by developing countries, especially LDCs,
today were made by the developing countries when the international IP
regime was inaugurated. Historically, those who argued against the French
position posited that the recognition of patents in and of itself benefited
society, because it encouraged invention. By contrast, the French urged that
the interests of society or consumers of IP rights should be specifically
recognized; it was insufficient to advance the general proposition that the
recognition of patents would, by itself, benefit society and consumers.
In 1925, the Paris Convention was amended to introduce compulsory
licensing as a condition precedent for the forfeiture of patents.4 2 Prior to
38

See PENROSE, supra note 3, at 160.

&

'9 Id. at 75.
40 Manu Thadikkaran, Local Working Requirement: Reconciling TRIPS Agreement with the
Paris Convention, 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 18-19 (2013). See also Paul Champ

Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An

Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2002); Michael
Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory
Licenses at InternationalLaw, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 246 (1998), available at http://
digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.calcgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1 605&context-ohlj.
41 PENROSE, supra note 3, at 50.
42 A. Jayagovind, The InternationalPatentsSystem and the Developing Countries, 20 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 47, 52, (1980). Note that compulsory licensing had been originally introduced in the
Convention in 1873, but was defeated in 1878. See PENROSE, supranote 3, at 79.
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that, Article 5(2) required a patentee "to exploit his/her patent in accordance
with the laws of the country into which s/he was introducing the patented
articles."4 3 Hence, the original emphasis on failure to work as a form of
abuse of rights that warranted forfeiture was watered down by the
introduction of compulsory licensing in the place of forfeiture." Simply put,
before 1925, a foreign patentee who was not working his or her patent was
regarded as engaging in an abuse of the patent rights and therefore eligible to
forfeit the patent; whereas, after 1925, forfeiture for failure to work was
substituted for the much weaker remedy of compulsory licensing.
Compulsory licensing is a much weaker remedy, because unlike forfeiture it
is consistent with the principle of patent protection in the Paris Convention.
Compulsory licensing, unlike forfeiture in the pre-1925 Paris Convention, is
consistent with the principle of patent protection because it does not involve
the patentee losing compensation for his/her invention.45
In 1958, around the time when newly independent developing countries
began joining the Union in large numbers,46 a new Section 5A was added to
the Paris Convention, re-introducing remedies for failure to work.4 7
However, the grant of compulsory licensing in cases of failure to work or
insufficient working was not to be issued before the expiration of a certain
period: four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three
years from the date of grant of the patent, whichever period expires last.48
Other conditions for the grant of a license were also imposed. For
example, a patent holder had to be given a right to defend the failure to work
before the license could issue. In addition, the license had to be non-

43 See RALPH H. FLOSOM ET AL., NAFTA: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 398 (2000)

(quoting Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention as originally ratified in 1883).
1 Union members began to recognize the right of forfeiture-the outright revocation of a
patent-in the 1878 conference. Paradoxically, it was at this conference where the principle
of compulsory licensing for failure to work was rejected while the Union members were
nonetheless strengthening patent protection as a private right. See PENROSE, supra note 3, at
51-52.
45 Id. at 161.
46 For details on accession dates, see WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang-en
&treaty id=2.
47 Jayagovind, supra note 42, at 52-54.
48 Article 5A(4) provided that "An application for a compulsory license may not be made
on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of
four years or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires

last." 1 Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm 28 (1971) (citing
Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention as in effect in 1958).
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exclusive and could not be transferred. A non-exclusive license did not
transfer exclusive rights to a licensee in a developing country to perform the
licensed patented act. As such, others with superior technical knowledge and
finances could very well perform the patented act. Consequently, lack of
technical expertise in a developing country might inhibit successful working
of patent without the grant of an exclusive license. It would be risky for a
firm in a developing country to start investing in the licensed technology
only to have firms from developed countries undertake the same initiative
thereby frustrating the transfer of technology from developed to developing
country firms.49 Another condition for granting compulsory licensing gave
the patentee a right to work the patent for a period of two years after a
finding that the patent had not been worked before proceedings for granting
the license could be commenced.so These conditions illustrate the weakening
of the restraints on abuse of patents and the simultaneous strengthening of
patents as private property rights encumbered with fewer and fewer restraints
in the public interest, particularly those aimed at curbing the potential abuse
of monopoly power through restrictive business practices injurious of the
public interest that patents are supposed to serve. 51
The enhanced rights of patentees in the Paris Convention were further
reinforced through a protectionist trade regime. Tariffs had the same effect
as forfeiture of a patent right in the case of non-use, because forfeitures
precluded foreign goods from entering the protected economy and the
domestic exploitation of the patent was possible in those countries.5 2 As a
result, patentees freely exploited markets of non-Union countries where there
were no restraints in competition or working requirements.53 For non-Union
countries and territories, the Convention's benefits of technology transfer
were therefore unrealizable. Consequently, Non-Union member countries
and territories became export enclaves of the producers of patented products

4 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The International Patent
System: The Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, ¶ 35,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2, (1977) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Paris Revision]. Here, it must of
course be acknowledged that by granting non-exclusive licenses competition would be
encouraged and there would be less of an attempt to monopolize or engage in restrictive
business practices. See PENROSE, supra note 3, at 103.
so Paris Convention, supra note 37, art. 5(3); see also Jayagovind, supra note 42, at 53.
1 UNCTAD, Paris Revision, supra note 49, at 39.
52 Kronstein & Till, supra note 36, at 776.
s Id. at 777.
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who based all their manufacturing in the developed union member
countries. 54
To further buttress the rights of patentees, they created cartel
arrangements amongst domestic competitors within Union member
countries, further protecting themselves from external competition through
private agreements.
For example, in the dyestuff industry, Germany pooled
its patents into major conglomerates that closed off the industry to new
entrants. This strategy resulted in large sums of capital that could be used for
further research and development by existing German corporations.56
When Switzerland refused to extend patents for chemical processes to
German applicants, Germany teamed up with the United States to bring a
claim against Switzerland. Germany and the United States asked the Union
to take action against Switzerland for failing to extend patents to German
applicants who were threatening to compete with the Swiss dyestuff
industry. 57 The claim alleged that the Swiss discrimination against German
applicants was inconsistent with the Union's requirement of equal treatment
between nationals and foreigners.
Suffice to say that even before
developing countries emerged from de-colonization after World War H, the
international patent regime not only sanctified patents as private property
rights, but also entrenched these rights through "tightly coordinated" tariffs
and restrictive business practices.59 This state of affairs is analogous to the
gridlock economy in the contemporary period discussed at the very
beginning of Part III, Section B of this Article.

54 According to Stephen P. Ladas:
[Clolonies, possessions, protectorates, dominions, and the like, are not
deemed to be included in the Union by the mere fact of accession of the
mother country. There must be a declaration to this effect by the latter, or a
distinct act of accession for the dominion, colony, and so forth which is to be
considered as forming part of the territory of the Union.
STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 182 (1930).

5 Kronstein & Till, supra note 36, at 777.
56 Id at 777-78.
5 Id at 778-79.
58 Id

5 Id at 780-81. For an evaluation of the costs of this system relative to its proclaimed
benefits, see PENROSE, supra note 3, at 110-36.
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B. The ParisConvention, Non-IndustrializedMembers and the Development
Question
As a result of the Paris Convention's insensitivity towards the interests of
developing countries-particularly in the post-colonial period-the
relationship between this regime and the developing countries' national
development goals became a major concern. These countries, primarily
those of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, used their majorities in the U.N.
General Assembly rather than going through the mechanisms of the Union
for the Protection of Industrial Property.60 For example, in 1961 Brazil
introduced a draft resolution into the General Assembly entitled "The Role of
Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Underdeveloped Countries."61 This
Resolution sought, among other things, to spur revision of patent legislation
in the respective countries in order to serve national economic development
goals.
Brazil's draft resolution also called for a revision of the Paris Convention
with a view to adding provisions that would enable developing countries to
In particular, it sought to remove
have access to technical knowledge.
barriers hindering developing countries' access to technical knowledge in
three ways: First, by revising Convention provisions that inhibited patents
being taken out by foreigners without the intention of local exploitation;
second, by revising provisions that permitted license contracts with
restrictive clauses; finally, by addressing the manner in which royalty
payments on foreign IP rights had become a heavy burden on balance of
payments. Additionally, the resolution proposed a conference to effect these
and other changes.6 2
Developed countries opposed the draft resolution, claiming it would
encroach on the exclusive mandate of the Paris Union. The final resolution
of the United Nations did not address the question of holding a conference to
resolve developing country concerns.63 Therefore, it implicitly endorsed the
Paris Convention. It was not until the 1977 UNCTAD proposal to revise the
Paris Convention that developing countries' position was endorsed-again
60 SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

(1998). Besides merely the U.N., developing countries relied also on
WIPO to try and reform the international patent system. Id.
61 See Jayagovind, supra note 42, at 57. This was a classic example of regime shifting.
AND ANTITRUST 107-40

62

Id.

U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, The Role of Patents in the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. E/3681/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 65.I.B.1 (1964).
63
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outside the framework of the Paris Convention.' This proposal sought to
make compulsory licensing a positive instrument to promote industrialization
rather than as a mere sanction for the failure to work a patent. 65 Hence,
developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s sought to transform the
international patent system into an
[E]ffective medium for the transfer of technology from
developed to developing countries. Just as the national patent
system presupposes free competition among a large number of
firms of similar size and capabilities ... [these countries
argued that the concepts of] equity and distributive justice
[were] alien to the very scheme of the system.66
Therefore, it is noteworthy that for developing countries the international
protection of patents ought to be predicated on the ability to work patents and
prevent their abuse. France did that in the nineteenth century, the developing
countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean did it in the
1950s and '60s; and developing countries do it today.67 So, while the debate
historically was-unlike today-defined by the issues such as access to
essential medicines and the protection of traditional knowledge, the issue of
encouraging the transfer of technology was no less present, as evidenced by
the debate surrounding compulsory licensing and forfeiture, and the
appropriate balance between protection of rights of IP producing and
consuming countries.
While the principle of balancing between the interests of producers and
consumers of IP rights is recognized in some domestic IP regimes, 68 it seems
curiously absent in the international system especially with regard to the
balance between IP-producing and -consuming countries. In the United
States, the Constitution-it has been argued-strikes a balance between
intellectual property and an intellectual commons, and if the balance tilts too
heavily in one direction the public loses its constitutionally protected rights
to a vigorous public domain.69
" UNCTAD, Paris Revision, supra note 49.
See generally Constantive V. Vaitsos, The Revision of the InternationalPatent System:
Legal Considerationsfor Third World Position, 4 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 85, 94 (1976).
66 Jayagovind, supra note 42, at 56.
6s

67 Id. at 58.
68 See id. at 60.

69 See, e.g., John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
649, 649 (1947) (arguing that "Despite an occasional mystic who persists in viewing our

516

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:499

C. From the ParisConvention to the TRIPSAgreement
The foregoing discussion regarding developments within the Paris
Convention demonstrates the historically fractious nature of the place of
public policy within the international patent protection system. Like the
1995 TRIPS Agreement which is discussed in this section, the Paris
Convention has therefore been argued to reflect
[A]n asymmetry between, on the one hand, the obligations for
countries spelled out in considerable detail via the provisions
which secure private rights, and, on the other, the minimal and
feeble reference to possible methods of control in the public
interest. This imbalance between the strong emphasis on
private rights and the virtual elimination of both the concept of
private obligation and the concept of public interest is a main
feature of the Paris Convention.70
For these reasons, developing countries sought to revise the Paris Convention
throughout the 1960s and through to the early 1980s. However, these
revision efforts came to a deadlock because developed countries, led by the
United States, opposed these revision initiatives.
In the 1980s, the United States forged a new approach to negotiating
international patent agreements. Rather than pursuing the deadlocked Paris
Convention path, the United States began a policy of negotiating bilateral IP
agreements, 72 thereby breaking up the solidarity among developing countries

patent system as a sacred cow, not to be touched, much less slaughtered, I take it there is no
serious challenge today of the proposition that the patent system has for its primary purpose
the advancement of the public interest and that it must be evaluated in the light of that
interest-and, if necessary, changed to promote it."). See also James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33 (2003); Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition From Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
70 UNCTAD, Paris Revision, supra note 49, para. 15 on p. 5.
71 SELL, supra note 60, at 130.
72 Id. at 132. Sell notes that the shift to bilateral intellectual property agreements was an
important step in the U.S.' International IP approach, because it invited the participation of
trade officials instead of IP administrators into the negotiations. Sell asserts that this shift
increased the likelihood of successfully changing laws in targeted countries, because trade
policymakers have more clout than IP officials in developing countries. Consequently, the
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in the Paris Convention revision meetings.7 3 This policy of bilateral
agreements was accompanied by a legal and policy shift in U.S. foreign trade
policy towards enhanced protection of its IP rights abroad.
This is particularly reflected in the 1984 and 1988 amendments to the
Trade Act of 1974, which added § 301 and super § 301 respectively. 4 Super
§ 301 requires the U.S. Trade Representative to unilaterally-without
resorting to the binding and compulsory dispute settlement body of the
WTO-impose retaliatory trade sanctions on any country in violation of U.S.
IP rights." This reflects the acknowledgment by the industries that
supported the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement and industrial economies
such as the U.S. government that
any robust level of intellectual property protection is dependent
on (i) one time .. . fixed-cost lobbying expenditures to generate
the initial set of legal entitlements, [the TRIPS Agreement],
followed by (ii) continuing variable-cost expenditures of
several billions of dollars annually by entitlement holders, [e.g.
Super 301 actions as well as the availability of enforcement
through dispute settlement at the WTO], who consume legal

U.S. was unable to leverage itself better since trade officials would be able to influence
legislative change once they reached an agreement with the U.S. See also James Thuo Gathii,
The Neo Liberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 WASH. L. REv. 421, 429 (2011).
73

Developing countries tended to vote as a block within a coalition labeled the Group of

77. See SELL, supra note 60, at 119-29.
7 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1301, 1303 (1988) [hereinafter Special 301] (amending the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-316, §§ 302(b), 182). Under this section, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is
required, within 180 days after the submission of the annual National Trade Estimates (foreign

trade barriers), to report to Congress those foreign countries that (1) deny adequate and
effective protection of U.S. intellectual property rights and (2) those countries under
subsection (1) that are determined by the USTR to be priority foreign countries. The USTR
identifies as priorities only those countries that have the most onerous or egregious acts,
policies, or practices that have the greatest adverse impact on the relevant U.S. products and
that are not entering good faith negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral and
multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property rights

protection. Id. In a challenge at the WTO, this notorious legal provision of U.S. law was
sustained.

See Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,

17.22, WT/DSl52/R (Jan. 27, 2000).
" Special 301, supra note 74.
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entitlements as determined by marginal private cost-benefit
valuations."6
This new policy of enhanced international protection of U.S. IPR further
sought to link trade to IPR. This link would achieve two further U.S. aims.
First, it would steer away from WIPO, which was increasingly becoming a
center of gravity for the revision of the Paris Convention for developing
countries.77 Second, and most importantly, such a move would give the U.S.
an additional mechanism, the international trading system, through which to
crank up support and observance of its IP rights; particularly through the
legally binding and compulsory dispute settlement system established by the
Uruguay Round."
Of course, these policy shifts did not occur in a political vacuum. A
group of high technology multinational corporations known as the
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC)79 played a critical role in influencing
these policy shifts.so Links between the IPC and the U.S. federal government
resulted in a powerful private/public sector collaboration. For example,
Edmund Pratt Jr., then chairman and CEO of Pfizer, had been a member of
President Carter's Advisory Committee on Trade and Policy Negotiations
(ACTPN) since 1979, which was created under the 1974 Trade Act.i The
76

See Jonathan Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation

Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 397 (2009).
1 Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 57 (2004). Helfer refers to such
shifts as "regime shifting." Regime shifting diverts attention and resources from one treaty

regime to another and in this case is done with a view to serve the interests of developed
countries while appearing to address the needs of developing countries. Id.
* The U.S. also linked its participation in the Generalized System of Payments (GSP) to
observance of its intellectual property rights. See SELL, supra note 60, at 134-35.
* Its members included Pfizer, General Electric, Merck, IBM, Dupont,

Warner

Communications, Hewlett-Packard, Bristol-Myers, FMC Communications, General Motors,
Johnson and Johnson, Monsanto, and Rockwell International.
so Susan Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 481, 487

(2002).
" See 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (2000). Under the 1974 Trade Act, as amended by the Trade Act
of 2002, the ACTPN was established alongside other advisory committees to ensure that U.S.
trade policy and trade negotiation objectives adequately reflect U.S. commercial and
economic interests.

Congress subsequently enhanced the role of this system by authorizing

the advisory committees to provide advice on the priorities and direction of U.S. trade policy.
The three-tiered committee structure established under the 1974 Trade Act contemplates that
the ACTPN would have the most senior membership appointed by the President from diverse

groups including the government, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service
industries, retailers, consumer interests, and the general public. The second tier is composed
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role of this private sector advisory group is and was to advise the U.S. Trade
Representative's Office (USTR) on trade policy, as well as to review and
report to Congress on the work of the USTR.8 2 Pratt and IBM chairman John
Opel jointly chaired the IP task force of the ACTPN.83
This successful private/public collaboration is not surprising in part
because it was and still is entrenched within the federal government's trade
policy and negotiating apparatus as mandated by law.84 Businesses also play
a central role in shaping U.S. foreign trade policy, particularly because
favoring the political process as the primary forum for resolving the
interlocking trade concerns through Congressional control over trade policy
provides these businesses with "continuous and unlimited opportunities for
business lobbying.""8 These private sector groups also had (and continue to
have) a huge stake in the direction of U.S. trade policy, and therefore employ
large numbers of lobbyists to seek legislation on their behalf. For example,
the pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the most profitable industries in
the United States, employs at least two lobbyists for every member of
Congress.
As a result of the efforts of the IPC and other related groups, the United
States supported inclusion of IP rights within the international trade agenda
during the Uruguay Round of talks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

of policy advisory committees representing sectors of the economy such as industry,
agriculture, labor and services. Policy advisory committees advise the government regarding
the impact of various trade measures on their respective sectors. The third tier is composed of
industry sector advisory committees consisting of experts from various fields. Their role is to

provide specific technical information and advice on trade issues involving their particular
sector. The USTR and the Secretary of the relevant department or agency appoint members of

the second and third tier.
82 Id
83 James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition
Policy
Consistently With FacilitatingAccess to Affordable Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53
FLA. L. REv. 727, 754-57 (2001).
84 Id. See also GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
IN W.T.O. LITIGATION 46 (2003).
8s Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and ForeignPolicy, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67, 69 (1997).
86 Oxfam Int'l, Pfizer: Preventing the Cure: Corporate Lobbying and Fair Access
to
Medicines (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 2, July 5, 2001), available at http://policy-practice.oxf

am.org.uk/publications/formula-for-fairness-patient-rights-before-patent-rights-1 14031;

see

also DEE MAHAN, PROFITING FROM PAIN: WHERE PRESCRIPTION DRUG DOLLARS Go (2002)
(claiming that, contrary to pharmaceutical company claims that an overwhelming amount of
their returns go to research and development, most of it goes to lucrative executive
compensation packages, marketing, advertising and administration).
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Trade particularly in the early 1990s.87 As a result of the way in which this
group lobbied for support, both within the United States and among U.S.
allies, as well as through the pressure of unilateral trade sanctions under
super § 301, the TRIPS Agreement was formulated very consistently with
U.S. interests." For example, the right of a WTO member country to engage
in compulsory licensing, with the exception of emergency situations or in
cases of public, non-commercial use, is subject to a multitude of exceptions,
making it virtually impossible to "break" patents."9 Additionally, although
the TRIPS Agreement refers to technology transfers, it does not place
equally rigorous requirements on technology transfer as a precondition for
receiving patent protection unlike in prior versions of the Paris Convention. 90

7 Sell, supra note 80, at 489, 493.
" Gathii, supra note 83, at 754-57.
* An excerpt of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement demonstrates some of the rigid
requirements for deviating from patent protection:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following
provisions shall be respected: (a) authorization of such use shall be
considered on its individual merits; (b) such use may only be permitted if,
prior to such use the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that
such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time.... (c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the
purpose for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor
technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a
practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive; (d) such use shall be non-exclusive; (e) such use shall be nonassignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys
such use; (f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use; (g) authorization
for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The
competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated
request, the continued existence of those circumstances.
TRIPS Agreements, supra note 36, art. 31.
An amendment to the TRIPS Agreement allowing countries with pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity to manufacture drugs for countries without such capacity as under a
compulsory license came into effect in January 2017. This modifies Article 31(g) of the
TRIPS Agreement, see https://www.wto.org/English/news-e/newsl7_e/trip_23janl7_e.htm.
90 There is only one direct reference to technology transfer in the TRIPS Agreement.
Article 7, which is an Objectives Clause (and not therefore a substantive commitment)
provides:
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For process patents, the TRIPS Agreement puts the burden of proof in an
infringement suit on the defendant." In the developing country and the LDC
context, ill-financed defendants will potentially come face to face with "wellfinanced" developed country accusers who could much more easily bear the
burden of proving infringement.92 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement contains a
number of thoroughly watered down protections of the public interest. It
affords a heightened level of protection of patents.9 3
The upshot of the foregoing analysis yields several observations
regarding how the TRIPS Agreement transformed the system set in place by
the Paris Convention. First, it did so by having the WTO, an international
institution backed by a binding and compulsory dispute settlement system,
become a major international IP law player. 94 Second, the TRIPS Agreement
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to the social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Id. art.7.
91 Id art. 34.
92 Mark Ritchie, Kristin Dawkins & Mark Vallianatos, Intellectual Property Rights and

Bio-Diversity: The IndustrializationofNaturalResources and TraditionalKnowledge, 11 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 438 (1996).
9 Article 7 of TRIPS notes:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 7. The Agreement further provides in Article 8(2) that
"Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders
or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology." Id. art. 8(2). Technology transfer is further referred to under Article
66(2) with reference to least-developed countries and under Article 67, which encourages
technical cooperation in technology transfer between developing and developed countries.
Pursuant to these provisions Brazil enacted a working requirement in its patent law. The U.S.
filed but withdrew a WTO complaint against Brazil on the basis that the Brazilian working
requirement was illegal pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement. See Peter Capella, Brazil Wins
IV Drug Concession From US, THE GUARDIAN (June 26, 2001, 5:26 PM), http://www.thegu
ardian.com/business/200 Ij un/26/intemationaleducationnews.medicalscience; see also Paul
Champ & Amir Attaran, PatentRights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement:
An Analysis ofthe U S.-Brazil PatentDispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 380 (2002).
' The WIPO was thought of as ineffective and is now seen or regarded to have become reenergized since the emergence of the WTO in 1995. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture
of the InternationalIntellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 1005 (2002).
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departed from the norm of regulatory diversity which underpinned the Paris
Convention model. Under the Paris Convention model, patent rights were
regarded as a national prerogative rather than having international scope
which they acquired under TRIPS.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, there is now a minimum international
substantive regime of IP rights protections countries should adopt. The
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement give countries little choice regarding
the scope and extent of the patent rights they can grant since the Agreement
aims at deep integration rather than the regulatory diversity which was
characteristic of the pre-TRIPS period.95 For example, the flexibility to
exclude certain inventions in the public interest, such as pharmaceuticals,
from patent protection was discontinued under the TRIPS Agreement. The
TRIPS Agreement also put in place judicial and administrative institutions,
procedures, safeguards, and remedies that countries must adopt to further
secure the rights protected under the treaty. With regard to patents, only
those that are capable of industrial application are protected.96 Further, the
TRIPS Agreement is non-derogable-countries cannot make reservations
without the consent of all signatory state parties, which would seem rather
hard to attain.97
As LDCs have achieved progress at the WTO in putting the brakes on the
rapid expansion of the TRIPS Agreement, developed countries have resorted
to bilateral trade agreements to introduce strengthened IP protections. A
critical challenge for LDCs in such bilateral agreements is that they lack an
effective mechanism to do the job that institutions in developed states do at
the domestic level-to manage the "tensions between competing interests in
access and exclusion, change and stability, wealth inequality, liberty and
security" in property rights." Hence, while the South African Customs
Union has the economic clout to successfully resist a typical U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) that comes loaded with TRIPS-PLUS provisions, less
economically powerful groups cannot resist these measures. For example, in
the U.S.-Morocco FTA, Morocco agreed to extremely broad protections of
IP rights beyond those it had committed to under the TRIPS Agreement.99

" Gathii, supra note 83, at 761.
96 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 27(1).
9 Id. art. 72.
98 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATION OF

OWNERSHIP 36 (2001).

9 James Thuo Gathii, The Neo-Liberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 WASH. L.
REv. 421, 466-67 (2011).
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Examples of such WTO-Plus protections in the U.S.-Morocco FTA include
data exclusivity protections that prevent generic competitors from using
clinical trial data, prohibitions on registration of competing generics prior to
the expiration of the patent protection period, ensuring extended terms of
protection for copyrighted works, requiring governments to take steps to
prohibit the marketing of pharmaceutical products that infringe patents, and
notification requirements for when the infringement is to be challenged, and
criminalizing software piracy.' 00 Little wonder Pharma has referred to this
agreement as "the most advanced ... in any FTA negotiated so far" and a
benchmark for future agreements.i'
The ongoing contestation about the role of IP rights in developing
countries resulted in a 2007 WIPO General Assembly Development
Agenda.' 02 This agenda notes the importance of ensuring that IP-related
activities promote the transfer and dissemination of technology to developing
countries. 0 3
This is particularly important since many of the patents
protected in developing countries, including LDC's, are foreign owned and
are held by multinational corporations who rarely use their technology in
developing countries, or even LDCs.1 0 4
IV. EXAMINING CLAIMS OF STRONG IP PROTECTION WITH STRENGTH IN
ATTRACTING FDI
A. A LiteratureSurvey
The claim that strong IP protection will attract FDI in LDCs is weak. To
the extent that studies have sought to examine this relationship, there is little
data that specifically isolates LDCs from higher income developing
countries. Yet, LDCs do not share the same characteristics of vulnerability
as low or lower-middle income developing countries. In Part II, we saw that
an LDC is an economy with a gross national income per capita of below
$750. LDCs are extremely poor countries. Notably, as of July 1, 2014, the
World Bank classifies countries with an average gross national income per

100 See James Thuo Gathii, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES
(2013); Gathii, supranote 99, at 464-67.
101 Frequently Asked Questions, EXPORT.Gov, http://www.export.gov/faq/eg main_017504.
102 THE 45 ADOPTED RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER THE WIPO DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.intlexport/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf
103 Id. at 4.
i" Vaitsos, supra note 65, at 9.
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capita of $1,045 USD or less in 2013 as low-income countries. Countries
with an average gross national income per capita of $1,045-$4,125 USD as
05
The
of July 1, 2014 are classified as lower middle-income countries.
World Bank categorizes both low and lower middle-income countries as
developing countries.
Clearly, the category of developing countries is rather broad-spanning
from LDCs that have a lower than $750 gross national income per capita at
the lower end, to lower-middle countries with as high as $3,975 gross
national income per capita. Given that there are significant income gaps
between LDCs and developing countries in general, data on the strength of
IP protection in attracting greater FDI in "developing countries" cannot be
representative of a typical LDC. In addition to differences in gross national
income per capita, LDCs differ from other developing countries in technical
capacity and capability as well as resource constraints. A good illustration of
this difference is amply demonstrated by the fact that for purposes of the
06
WTO, South Korea has self-designated itself as a developing country.'
There is a huge gap in the levels of technical capacity and capability as well
as in resources between South Korea and an LDC like Haiti.
That said, let me begin by summarizing a variety of studies that have
linked IPR protection of one kind or another to economic growth or
technology or skills transfer. Strong patent protection by itself, without high
threshold levels of secondary education attainment in a particular country,
does not correlate to a positive impact on growth.107 Further, high levels of
technical expertise in making a strong IP regime work against abuse-e.g., to
check broad grants of patents, impose stringent criteria on novelty, and other
criteria on patentability-are crucial to facilitate local learning and
innovation; without which, recipients of foreign technology become
platforms for foreign exporters without added benefits to their technical
progress. 0 s Unlike upper middle-income countries-which have a gross

105 Updated Income Classifications, WORLD BANK (July 3, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/
news/2015-country-classifications.
in Countries self-designate as developing countries in the WTO. GROUPS IN THE WTO,
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda-e/negotiatinggroupse.pdf (last updated July
7, 2014).

107 E. Borensztein et al., How Does Foreign DirectInvestment Affect Economic Growth, 45
J. INT'L EcoN. 115, 127 (1998).
108 See Maskus, supra note 6, at 476, for a statement that the central element of an

intellectual property system is enforcement which entails: (1) punishing infringement by free
riders, and (2) disciplining enterprises that try to extend their rights beyond intended levels by
acting in an anti-competitive manner; both tasks requiring the development of extensive legal
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'

national income per capita of between $4,125-$12,746 as of July 1, 2014LDCs do not have these high levels of expertise or the human capital to
capitalize effectively on adopting imported technologies for local uses.
In addition, there are high costs to the implementation of IP regimes for
LDCs.
World Bank research demonstrates that the implementation of
mandates such as the TRIPS Agreement impose expensive costs that
undermine potential poverty reduction and economic growth, especially in
least developed countries. 109 LDCs are unlikely to undertake these reforms
without significant assistance or coercion.
For these reasons, Jerome
Reichman has noted that there are risks of sudden strengthening of patent
rights among countries not yet able to harmonize their domestic regimes with
international norms."i 0
Further, the predictions of positive economic outcomes that are claimed
to be correlated with strong IP protection demonstrate net welfare losses in
the short term before the dynamic benefits are realized in the longer term. 11
For example, in 1995, U.S. resident firms earned $20.9 billion in net royalty
and licensing fees." 2 The access to medicines debate in relation to patents
was premised precisely on the imbalance between the net welfare gains in
the North and the sheer inability of the indigent populations of developing
and LDCs to afford life-saving drugs."'

and scientific expertise. However, it is necessary to emphasize that many LDCs simply do not
have the capacity and institutions to fulfill such enforcement tasks. See also WLLIAM
ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN

CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995) (arguing that protecting IP rights in China before the protection
of individual rights was fully realized was problematic).
10. See J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments:
The Development Challenge, World Bank Development Research Group (1991), http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/457771468752978781/Implementatin-of-Ururguay-Roun
d-commitments-the-development-challenge.
110 Jerome Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 255 (1993) ("The interests of states at different stages
of development, and the absorption of intellectual property will have to accommodate these
norms and ... [p]remature efforts to accelerate the process of harmonization without due
regard to these differences and to the social costs of overcoming them could boomerang
against those countries pressing for rapid social change and could even widen the initial
differences in the end.").
...Maskus, supra note 6, at 489.
112 Id. at 494.
113 See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong PharmaceuticalPatent
Protectionin U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 267 (2003); James Thuo

Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarationon TRIPS and Public Health Under the
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For these and other reasons, strong IP regimes are more beneficial for
middle- and high-income countries with the appropriate conditions for
maximizing the benefits of imported technologies. By contrast, the positive
impact of strong IP regimes in LDCs is at best likely to be small, and such
gains are likely to be overrun by the higher cost of implementing these
commitments. 14
There is evidence that increased machinery and equipment imports from
OECD countries to developing countries "tended to raise total factor
productivity" by about 0.03% on average.' If this is so, then it is plausible
to make the claim that economic assistance to LDCs to import machinery
and equipment not only from OECD countries but also from cheaper sources
such as India and China-which now compete very well with OECD
machinery manufacturers-could help them not only to improve their
productivity, but also alleviate problems such as food security that are
directly related to low nutritional levels.
This Paper's central claim is that LDCs are poorly equipped to implement
Western-style strong IPR regimes from both an institutional and cultural
perspective.1 6 An LDC's sudden adoption of a strong IPR regime does not
somehow wipe the slate clean and imbue the country's citizenry with a
newfound respect for IP rights.' 17 In addition to being adopted by a
legislative body, a statutory regime must appeal to citizens' inherent sense of
fairness, equity, and legitimacy in order to gain broad acceptance.

&

Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291 (2002); Gathii, supra
note 83.
114 Maskus, supra note 6, at 487.
15 Id. at 482 (citing David J. Coe et al., North-South R&D Spillovers, 107 EcoN. J. 134, 147
(1997)).
"6 By institutional perspective, I am speaking in terms of a lack of technical capability and
proficiency, and weak human assets and resource constraints.
117 See ALFORD, supra note 108, at 112-23 (claiming efforts to introduce IP laws in China
are deeply flawed due to a failing to reconcile their Western legal roots with China's past and
contemporary constraints). See also Ruth L. Gana, Has CreativityDied in the Third World?:
Some Implications of the Internationalizationof Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L.
POL'Y 109, 132 (1995) (arguing in part that a Western "absolutist conception of property"
rights defined in relation to the right to exclude does not take into account differing notions of
property in the developing world); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC
CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT 505 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] (analyzing the impact of IPR regimes on the development
process and making proposals for what would constitute an ideal IPR regime in both advanced
and developing countries).
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A strong IPR regime on its own will not be sufficient to overcome longstanding legal and cultural norms that have not given the same level of
deference to the rights of IP owners. "[A] country's system of intellectual
property protection is inextricably bound up with its entire legal and social
system and its attitudes toward private property; it involves much more than
the passage of a patent or copyright law."" According to this view, an
LDC's wholesale adoption of Western-styled IPRs, without allowing for a
period of industrial, institutional, and cultural development, puts the
proverbial cart before the horse. Therefore, investors and policymakers
should not anticipate adoption of IPRs at the governmental level to have
meaningful impact among a populace that has not been acculturated to view
IPR rights and obligations as legitimate.
Finally, there is evidence that licensing of IP goods was unrelated to the
strength or weakness of IP regimes and further that FDI was highest among
the mineral rich war-torn LDCs in Africa."l 9 This further undermines claims
of a positive relationship between strong IP regimes and strength in attracting
FDI.' 20
In fact, many resource-rich LDCs--such as Angola and the
Democratic Republic of Congo-that have a large share of FDI flows to
developing countries are also war-torn and have extremely weak rule of law
systems. This undermines claims linking strong IP protection regimes and
strong FDI flows.
By contrast, my argument is that strong IP protection works best to raise
growth in conjunction with trade openness, high levels of human capital
accumulation, good infrastructure and a strong regulatory environment.
Strengthening IP protection without simultaneously addressing the
conditions correlated with low growth and productivity in least developed
countries will not yield the benefits that accompany strengthening of IP
regimes in economies where the right conditions for positive benefits do
exist.' 2 ' In fact, the small market sizes, low gross national incomes, poor
infrastructure, low educational attainments, high levels of sovereign
indebtedness, regulatory barriers and political instability in some LDCs
1" Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer p. 20, para. 7 (Int'l Fin. Corp., Discussion Paper 19, 1994).

119 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 117, at 505.

120 See generally UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001: PROMOTING LINKAGES
(2001). This trend has continued because of the boom in natural resources in recent times.
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT: FDI FROM DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION
ECoNOMIES-IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT (2006). However as a share of global FDI

flows, least developed countries still receives a miniscule percentage.
121 Maskus, supra note 6, at 498.
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makes flows of FDI-even with strengthened IP protection-a challenge.
Further, assuming strong patent regimes are nevertheless adopted in LDCs,
they would discourage the costs of local enterprises and innovators to
imitate, copy, and borrow from imported technologies in much the same way
most developed economies began the early phase of their industrial
development. 1 22
There are other arguments that counsel against adopting strong IP
regimes. The next Part of this Article examines evidence from the U.S. and
elsewhere that demonstrates some of the limits that a particularly strong IP
protection regime may have. This examination provides another set of
reasons to be cautious about adopting IP regimes that do not carefully
123
balance between the rights of users and producers of IP rights.
B. Over-Abundance ofIPR Rights and Economic Gridlock
Michael Heller has persuasively argued that an over-abundance of
property rights recognition can cause economic "gridlock," when
economically productive uses and innovation become stifled by rights
owners' inability and/or unwillingness to reach mutually beneficial
agreements. 12 4 Heller's thesis is that excessive property rights can result in a
tragedy of the anti-commons,125 drawing on the familiar theory that
demonstrates how common ownership leads to overuse of finite resources.
For Heller, anti-commons "covers any setting in which too many people can
block each other from creating or using a scarce resource ... [T]he opposite
of overuse in a commons is underuse in an anti-commons."126
For example, after examining the experience of the Italian pharmaceutical
industry following the introduction of patents for medicines in 1978, Boldrin
and Levine found that "a thriving pharmaceutical industry had existed in
Italy for more than a century in the complete absence of patents." 27 Firms
122 See Alice Amsden, Why Isn't the Whole World Experimenting With the East Asian Model
to Develop?, 22 WORLD DEV. 627, 631 (1994).
1' For more on the importance of a balanced IP regime, see Mark A. Lemley, Property,

Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1031 (2004) (likening IP rights to
government subsidies rather than private property rights).
124 See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK EcoNoMY (2008).
125 See id. at 18-19 ("The anti-commons perspective shows that the content of property
rights matters as much as the clarity. Gridlock arises when ownership rights and regulatory
controls are too fragmented.").
126 Id. at 18.
127 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 223 (2010).
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that imitated and "improved upon existing products" and sold them to Italian
consumers at "much lower prices" characterized Italy's pre-1978
pharmaceutical industry.1 28 In addition to being affordable and efficient, the
Italian pharmaceutical industry pre-1978 was recognized as a leader in
innovation; accounting for 9.28% (108 out of 1282) of new active chemical
compound discoveries.
However, after the introduction of stronger TP protections, Italy's share of
worldwide compound discoveries dipped to 7.5% (8 out of 108) from 19801983. The surge of foreign manufacturers enforcing their patents granted
abroad not only ate away at local profits but also discouraged
experimentation that led to the development of new useful medications. 129
Additionally, stronger patent protection in Italy did not lead to an increase in
domestic or foreign direct investment.1 30 It may well be that the dwindling
fortunes and vibrancy of Italy's pharmaceutical sector is exactly what global
pharmaceutical industry had in mind when they advocated for the WTO's
adoption of the TRIPS agreement. According to Nobel Prize winning
economist and World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz, "one of the main
reasons the pharmaceutical industry was pushing for TRIPS was that they
wanted to reduce access to generic medicines"' 3 ' and thus force sick
consumers to buy their expensive name brand drugs.
The experience of India's pharmaceutical industry since 1978 offers
further evidence that strong patent protection is not a necessary precondition
for innovation or a local industry's growth.1 32 As stated by Boldrin and
Levine, "[s]ince 1978, India has taken over as the primary center of
pharmaceutical production without patent protection." 33 However, it is now
thought that India may be losing this strong position as it begins to institute
stronger IP protections as part of its obligations under the WTO-TRIPS
agreements. A 2003 paper by Chaudhuri, Goldberger, and Jia calculated the
impact of introducing a specific class of patented drugs (quinolones) on the

128

Id
Id at 222-23.
130 Ho, supra note 18, at 257 (citing F.M. Scherer & S. Weisburst, Economic Effects of
129

&

Strengthening PharmaceuticalPatent Protection in Italy, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.

COPYRIGHT L. 1009 (1995)).
"1 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundationsof Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J.
1693, 1701 (2008).
132 BOLDRLN & LEVINE, supra note 127, at 223.
133

Id.
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The authors state, "[t]he
Indian economy to be $305 million.' 34
overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss . . derives from the loss of
consumer welfare. In contrast, the profit gains to foreign producers in the
presence of price regulation are estimated to be only around $19.6 million
per year."135
Over-zealous pursuit and enforcement of patents can also bog down firms
and inventors in litigation, diverting vital resources and creative energy from
the research and development essential to innovation. The U.S. software
industry is currently facing this challenge. The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office's continued recognition of software patents that are overly broad and
intentionally vague is increasing the risks of litigation at the expense of
innovation.136 Software was long considered copyrightable but was not
regularly granted patent protection by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
until several federal court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s dramatically
expanded an inventor's ability to obtain patents in software. 137
According to Nobel Prize winning economist Eric Maskin, "the increase
in intellectual property [in the 1990s] was not accompanied by a
corresponding increase in innovation [in the U.S. software industry]," and
evidence suggests that the opposite may be true. 13 8 With thousands of
expansive and ill-defined software patents in circulation, firms are
increasingly at risk of inadvertently infringing another company's supposed
"property rights."l 3 9 According to Chris Sacca, a venture capitalist familiar

134 Id. at 223-24 (citing S. Chaudhuri, P. Goldberger & P. Jia, The Effects of Extending
IntellectualPropertyRights Protections to Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian
PharmaceuticalMarket (NBER, Working Paper No. 10159, 2003)).
135 Id. at 224.
136 See Tony Bradley, If Android Violates Patents, Shouldn't Microsoft Sue Google?, PC
WORLD (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/222825/ifandroidviolatespatents-shouldntmicrosoft suegoogle.html (noting that "Tech patents are often too
vague and broad and many probably should never have been granted in the first place").
"I See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (recognizing a computer program was
patentable if it met patentability requirements of novelty, nonobviousness and utility).
138 Interview by Alex Blumberg with Eric Maskin, Adams University Professor, Harvard
University, in National Public Radio Planet Money (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.
See also
npr.org/blogs/money/2011/08/05/138934689/the-tuesday-podcast-the-patent-war.
Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence
from the Courts, 130 Q. J. ECON. 317 (studying how patent rights affect the process of
cumulative innovation and specifically finding that patent rights owned by large firms block
small innovators).
139 "[ff you're selling online ...
there are 4,319 patents you could be violating. If you also
planned to advertise, receive payments for or plan shipments of your goods, you would need
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with the software industry, "[w]e're at a point in the state of intellectual
property where existing patents probably cover every single behavior that's
happening on the internet and our mobile phones today."l4 0
Several
opportunistic companies-many of which are run by lawyers, and not
engineers-have taken advantage of this situation by collecting thousands of
these ill-defined software patents without any intention of commercializing
the underlying technology.
Instead, these aptly named "patent trolls" use their stockpile of IP rights
to either extract licensing fees from or sue software firms who are
legitimately trying to develop new businesses or products.' 4 1 This has
resulted in what some in the industry have characterized as a "patent arms
race," where large technology firms spend billions for patent rights that they
have no intention of bringing to market.' 42 For example, in July 2011,
Google, Inc. attempted to spend over $3 billion for patents being sold off by
Nortel Networks Corp., for the sole purpose of warding off infringement
lawsuits against its Android operating system.1 43 Ultimately Google was
outbid by a consortium of technology companies-among them Apple and
Microsoft, strange bedfellows indeed-who spent over $4 billion for
Nortel's largely worthless trove of patents. Dean Becker, chief executive
officer of ICAP Patent Brokerage, the world's largest patent seller stated,
"[e]very operating company is in the market because of the expense,
distraction and the potential financial risk of patent litigation."l 44

to be concerned with approximately 11,000." JAMES BESSON & MICHAEL M. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE 213 (2008).

140 Interview by Alex Blumberg with Chris Sacca, Proprietor, Lowercase
Capital, in This
American Life (July 22, 2011), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/
episode/441/transcript.

141 Rob Goodier, Patent Trolls: How Bad Is The Problem, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 25,

2011), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/a7213/patent-trolls-how-bad-is
-the-problem/.
142

Id.

143 Susan Decker, Google Left Searching for New Patent Assets After Nortel
Loss,
BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-05/google-left-searchi
ng-for-new-patent-assets-after-nortel-loss.html.
14 Id. See also Henry Chesbrough, Microsoft Should Welcome Piracy in India and China,
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-07-25/microsoftshould-welcome-piracy-in-india-and-chinabusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-fin
ancial-advice (arguing technology companies should not take a strong position on IP
enforcement in developing countries where openness may allow such companies to become
the dominant design used by consumers and thus win market share).
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C. Strong IPR ProtectionNot an OverridingFactorin FDIFlows
Strong IPR regimes alone are not sufficient to increase technology
transfer in developing countries. 14 5 A strengthened IPR regime can be
advantageous for countries that have "a certain degree of absorptive capacity
and strong technological infrastructures," whereas in poorer countries a
strong IPR regime will usually increase costs and reduce technology
transfer.i 46 Thus, a "one-size fits all" approach to IPRs will not generate
consistently beneficial results for economies that are yet to develop the
infrastructure, skilled labor force, and solid technological base necessary for
IPRs to attract increased foreign direct investment or stimulate widespread
homegrown innovation. 147 Proponents promising an influx of foreign
investment following the strengthening of IPR protections overlook the
economic and institutional prerequisites that typically must be in place in
order for a corporation to seriously consider making investments abroad.1 48
145 See Ho, supra note 18, at 256 (noting macroeconomic factors such as tax incentives,
infrastructure and skills are more relevant than intellectual property laws when multinational
companies choose to invest in countries); see also Mila Kashcheeva, The Role of Foreign
Direct Investment in the Relation Between Intellectual Property Rights and Growth, 65

OXFORD EcoN. PAPERS 699, 701-02, 718 (2013) (finding strong IPR regimes mitigate the
growth effect of FDI in developing economies and that more lax IPR may even increase the
growth rate).
i" Daniele Archibugi & Andrea Filippetti, The Globalisation of Intellectual Property

Rights, 1 GLOBAL POL'Y 137, 145 (2010).
147 See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship between Intellectual
Property Rights and Foreign DirectInvestment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 163, 168 (1998)

("Strengthened IPR protection will have different welfare implications depending on the
characteristics of each country. Generalizations can only be made if strong assumptions are
adopted.").
See also Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in
Intellectual Property Right Regimes, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 103-05 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993)

(arguing the benefits of pressuring weaker countries towards tighter IP protection standards
are unlikely to outweigh the costs, and that countries should tailor their IPR systems rather
than adopting a one-size fits all approach); Caroline B. Ncube, Harnessing Intellectual
Propertyfor Development: Some Thoughts on an Appropriate Theoretical Framework, 16
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 369 (2013) (proposing a theoretical framework for
intellectual property regimes such that IP rights are formulated and enforced to "meet societal
goals or serve the public, be responsive to the economic environment, and take cognizance of

the human rights claims of both creators and users").
148 See generally John H. Dunning, Explaining Changing Patterns of International
Production: In Defense of Eclectic Theory, 41 OXFORD BULL. EcoN. & STAT. 269 (1979)
(identifying three areas that are determinative in a corporation's decision to invest in

operations abroad: ownership of intangible assets, location advantages, and internalization of
production). See also Carsten Fink, Intellectual Property Rights and U.S. and German
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Specifically in regards to patents, Professor Cynthia Ho finds there is no
robust empirical evidence to support the claim that stronger patent rights
promote foreign direct investment.1 49
Besides ownership of high-value IP rights products or services,
economists and businesses have identified two additional conditions that
must be met in order for companies to consider investing overseas. The first
condition necessary for foreign investment is the country's so-called
"location advantages," which include "high transportation costs and tariffs,
low input prices, access to distribution networks, and local regulatory
environments." 0 A country that offers a low cost of doing business, minor
or at least predictable regulatory burdens, and a means to reliably deliver
products and receive inputs via transportation and communication networks
would be said to possess "location advantages." Additionally, a decision to
locate manufacturing or research and development abroad would likely be
affected by "the level of education and training of the local workforce, the
condition of its financial sector, the health of its legal system, and the
transparency of governmental procedures.""'
Second, not only must a country's legal regime and physical
infrastructure be conducive to outside investment, but the business itself
must also believe it profitable to "internalize production [in the foreign
country] rather than to sell or license their intellectual assets to independent
local firms . ... "152 Businesses must weigh the costs and benefits of shifting
International Transactions in Manufacturing Industries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carsten Fink & Keith E.
Maskus eds., 2005) (arguing IPRs do not play an important role in influencing total
international transactions of U.S. firms and are irrelevant in explaining the direct investment
stock of German firms in foreign countries); Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual
Property Protectionand U.S. Foreign DirectInvestment, 78 REv. ECON. & STAT. 181, 185-86
(1996) (arguing the mere passage of a law is insufficient to attract investment where there is a
perception of weak enforcement due to social and cultural factors); Rajnish Kumar Rai, Effect
of the TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign Direct Investment in
Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian PharmaceuticalIndustry, 11 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 404, 411 (2009) (noting IPR is only one factor in attracting FDI, which also
depends on "skill availability, technology status, R&D capacity, enterprise-level competence
and institutional and other supporting technological infrastructure").
149 Ho, supra note 18, at 256.
I Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 147, at 170.
1s1 Peter Yu, Intellectual Property, Foreign Direct Investment and the China Exception, in
THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 155 (quoting Paul J. Heald,
Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS

Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249, 259 (2003)).
152

Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 147, at 170.
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operations to a foreign country against simply collecting royalties from
licensing their IP to others, thus avoiding the difficulties of engaging in an
unfamiliar market. Indeed, even Edwin Mansfield, a well-known proponent
of the view that strong IPRs drive foreign direct investment, acknowledges
that "most [Research and Development] intensive firms seem to regard
intellectual property rights protection as an important fact, but only one of a
number of important factors, influencing their investment decisions.""' The
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which commissioned Mansfield's
study, is the largest source of multilateral loan and equity financing in the
Mansfield surveyed business leaders from major western
world."'
corporations on the impact that a foreign country's system of IPR protection
had on their company's decision to transfer technology and invest in research
and development in that market. Although Mansfield's results were not
unequivocal, the report shows that IPR protections have a "substantial effect"
on a company's decision to invest abroad. The study has since been cited by
proponents of IPR globalization as evidence that strong IPR protections
increase overall social welfare regardless of the country's stage of
development. Despite his well-known thesis that IPRs have a positive
impact on attracting foreign direct investment, Mansfield acknowledges that
IPRs have differing levels of importance in terms of influencing investment
decisions across various industries."s5
Several studies have shown that strong IPR protections have traditionally
failed to serve as an overriding incentive for firms to carry out foreign direct
investment activities because strong IPR regimes tend to favor licensing
relationships over production internalization. Professor Peter Yu notes that
"the strengthening of intellectual property protection may encourage firms to
conduct more arm's-length technology licensing, which in turn will result in
a reduction of FDI."'56 A body of economic and legal scholarship theorizes
that while IPRs may encourage investment in markets where the company
makes sales by deterring copyright infringement and "knock-offs," this
enhanced market power has a negligible if not inverse effect on a company's
decision to invest in R&D or manufacturing.

1"

Mansfield, supra note 118, at 25.

154 Overview, INT'L FiN. CoRp., http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corpext

content/ifc_
external corporate site/about+ifcnew.
155 Mansfield, supra note 118, at 28 ("It is important to note in this regard that patents are of
much less importance in many industries than in pharmaceuticals and chemicals.").
156 Yu, supra note 151, at 155.
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Companies are more willing to license their technology to local firms
when the country's legal regime recognizes IP rights and provides IP owners
some level of injunctive or punitive remedy against infringers. "[S]tronger
protection may reduce investment by encouraging investors to conduct
arm's-length transactions by licensing their products.""' However, when
firms decide to "internalize" R&D and manufacturing abroad, they are
"unlikely to require more protection than needed to ensure the non-disclosure
of technologies" from their in-house operations.' In the alternative, several
economists argue that "firms prefer foreign investment over licensing in the
case of weak [IPR] protection because internalized foreign production helps
firms to maintain direct control over their proprietary assets."" 9
Professor Peter Yu has argued that the experience of China in
successfully attracting foreign direct investment demonstrates that instituting
a strong IPR regime is not a necessary condition for these transactions to
occur.160
Although China's IPR protections remain "inadequate and
ineffective" compared with western standards, the country's "location
advantages," such as low labor costs, favorable regulatory treatment toward
foreign investors, and the country's rapidly developing physical
infrastructure, "easily make up for the losses incurred by ineffective
intellectual property protection." 16 ' Even though the Chinese market is
somewhat notorious for ongoing IPR violations, the country's capacity to
imitate and copy has proved to be an advantage for China in that it has
produced capable local firms for outside investors to partner with and an
157 Id. at 7.
158 Id. at 2.
1"

Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 147, at 172 (emphasis added). See also W. Lesser,

WIPO, The Effects of TRIPS-MandatedIntellectual PropertyRights on Economic Activities in
Developing Countries 7 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/aboutip/en/studies/pdf/ssa lesser trips.pdf (arguing that it is the product market potential not the
level of intellectual property rights protection that is the "principle issue for private firms
when identifying developing country markets").
i60 Yu, supra note 151, at 157. See also Ho, supra note 18, at 255-56 (supporting this

proposition and noting that in 2013 India had $1 billion in foreign direct investment in three
months despite controversial patent laws that have been noted as inadequate by many
companies); Frederick Abbott, Towards New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of
TRIPS and Variable Geometryfor the PreservationofMultilateralism, 8 J. INT'L EcON. L. 9,

77, 82 (2005) (arguing that Asia has seen the most significant growth in FDI, yet is a region
where IP protection regimes have been weak); C.M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY
OPTIONS (2000) (finding that Brazil and Thailand received substantial FDI in the 1970s and
1980s despite low levels of IP protection).
161 Yu, supra note 151, at 157.
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experienced manufacturing workforce.1 62 Imitation and copying were major
strategies of the East Asian tigers as well.'13 Another example where
imitation and copying resulted in the margins of an economically significant
industry is the Nollywood movie industry in Nigeria. Even though Nigeria
has a well-established copyright regime, the lack of copyright enforcement
was a key factor in the widespread dissemination of Nollywood films and the
rapid growth of the industry, which generates approximately $250 million
USD annually.1 64 As stated by Professor Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, "[a]s
Nollywood illustrates, businesses in development stages may actually benefit
and gain brand recognition and market share as a result of low levels of
intellectual property protection."l65

162 See id. ("Since reopening of its market to foreign trade in the late 1970s, China has
developed a strong imitative capacity ... such capacity explains China's ability to produce a
large amount of pirated and counterfeit products.").

163 ALICE AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 20-21

(1981) (arguing South Korea industrialized through a program of nationally owned firms that
included massive imports of foreign licenses and assistance with a view to attaining
"technological independence to avoid foreign control").
See also Arman S. Kirim,
Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish
PharmaceuticalIndustry, 13 WORLD DEv. 219, 219-36 (1985) (finding that FDI increased in
Korea's pharmaceutical industry after IP protection of drugs was abolished).
16 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Rise ofNollywood Creators, Entrepreneurs, and Pirates, 4,
9, 23 (U.C. Irvine Sch. L. Research Paper No. 2012-11, 2012), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfn?abstract id=2011980.
16s Id at 24-25.
Arewa notes that although low levels of IPR protection can benefit
emerging industries, once these industries are established-as can be seen in the case of
Nollywood-higher levels of copyright enforcement would actually benefit the further
development of the industry. Id. See also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation,
and Risk- Copyright and Musical Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1829-30 (2011)
(arguing copyright control mechanisms can pose a significant risk to creativity and innovation
because they do not acknowledge the role that existing works can play as a stimulus for
innovation); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspirationand Innovation: The IntrinsicDimension of
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947-49 (2006) (arguing people innovate for
reasons other than economic reward and that creativity is characterized by motivations such as
the desire for challenge, personal satisfaction, or the creation of works with a particular
meaning or significance for the author); Nagla Rizk, From de Facto Commons to Digital
Commons? The Case ofEgypt's Independent Music Industry, in INNOVATION & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: COLLABORATIVE DYNAMICS IN AFRICA 171, 179-81, 187-90 (Jeremy de Beer et al.

eds., 2014) (finding Egypt's independent musicians produce music for self-expression and
voicing opinion more than for monetary benefit); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in
CopyrightLaw, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197, 1207 (1996) (arguing increased copyright protection
for authors will reduce the supply of new works because the high cost of source material will
deter marginal authors from creating).
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The TRIPS Agreement obligates member states to adopt IPR standards
that are similar to those enforced by the U.S. and Europe. As noted by
Archibugi and Filippetti, "TRIPS constitutes the most important attempt to
establish a global harmonisation of Intellectual Property .. . protection and
enforcement... "166 As a requirement of WTO accession, developing
nations agree to enact baseline IP protections consistent with this goal of
"upward harmonization."
This can pose a challenge for countries
administering much weaker TP regimes or that-in some instances-have
traditionally refused to recognize certain classes of IP rights at all. For
example, prior to agreeing to abide by TRIPS, India prohibited "product
patent" protection for the entire pharmaceutical industry. 16 7
Although India eventually passed a "TRIPS compliant" patent law in
2005, the statute contains a restriction on patent holders' rights to extend the
lifespan of their monopoly over already known chemical compounds.
Section 3(d) of the statute restricts the practice of "ever-greening," whereby
patent holders are granted additional years of monopoly protection following
the discovery of an "incremental innovation"-such as switching from a
capsule to a tablet or finding a new use for a product-without a showing of
enhanced efficacy.i6 s At the time of its passage, the inclusion of Section 3(d)
stirred controversy, representing a coup for India's native pharmaceutical
industry at the expense of foreign interests who had hoped India's WTO
accession would facilitate the importation of western products and patent
practices into the Indian drug market.1 69 Not to be outdone by India's
legislative mandate, Western interests
sought to influence the
implementation of the statute at the administrative level.
There have been some high profile denials of patent extensions under
Section 3(d), demonstrating the efficacy of flexibilities that developing
countries can use to achieve important policies such as access to essential

166 Archibugi & Filippetti, supra note 146, at 138.
167 Bhaven Sampat, WIPO, InstitutionalInnovation or InstitutionalImitation? The Impacts
of TRIPs on India's PatentLaw and Practice3 (2010), available at http://www. wipo.int/edo
cs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo ipconge_6 10/wipo ipecon ge_6_10_ref sampat.pdf.
168 See Shalini Arora & Rekha Chaturvedi, Section 3(d): Implications andKey Concerns For
PharmaceuticalSector, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. RTs. 16 (2016), available at http://nopr.niscair.res.

in/bitstream/I 23456789/34013/l/JIPR%201 2(1)%2016-26.pdf.
169 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, § 3(d), Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India)
(prohibiting patentability where "[t]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance
which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance . . .").
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medicines.17 0 There have also been denials of patents based on pre-grant
oppositions by a variety of stakeholders including NGOs and generic
manufacturers under Section 3(d)."' Further, India's courts have used high
standards for patent eligibility, consistent with Indian law as well as the
flexibility that the TRIPS Agreement provides for countries to decide
standards of patentability.172
D. Examining the Historical Evidence
This strategy of looking at periods in which developed countries briefly
abandoned IP protection seems appropriate, because today all industrialized
countries have patent systems and therefore it is hard to find verifiable
empirical evidence to support causal links between IP protection and

17 For further analysis, see CYNTHIA Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THE GLOBAL EcoNOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 89-124 (2011). See also
Lisa Shuchman, India Patent Authority Has Big Pharma, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 15, 2012),

http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202574815027/India-Patent-Authority-Has-Big-Pharma-W
orried.
171 Id at 16-17. Notably, some scholars have argued that Indian patent examiners behave
much like patent examiners in the West who tend to approve most patent applications. See,
e.g., Sampat, supra note 167, at 13-16. According to Sampat, first, the developing country's
patent office will "rubber-stamp [the prior patent decisions of other TRIPS countries] rather
than subjecting them to national patent standards," either due to a lack of comfort with the
subject matter, a lack of resources, or both. Sampat, supra note 167, at 16-17. Second,
Sampat argues that staff from patent offices in the U.S. and Europe "provid[e] technical
assistance to developing-country counterparts," which may result in a "diffusion of [Western]
standards" into the patent oversight of a country like India. Id.
172 For a high profile denial of a western pharmaceutical patent, see Gardiner Harris & Katie
Thomas, Low-Cost Drugs in Poor Nations Get a Lift in Indian Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/global/top-court-in-india-rejects-novart
Notably, the Supreme Court of
is-drug-patent.html?pagewanted=l&r-1&smid-tw-share.
India stated:
[I1n this country the law of patent, after the introduction of product patent for
all kinds of substances in the patent regime, is in its infancy. We certainly do
not wish the law of patent in this country to develop on lines where there may
be a vast gap between the coverage and the disclosure under the patent;
where the scope of the patent is determined not on the intrinsic worth of the
invention but by the artful drafting of its claims by skillful lawyers, and
where patents are traded as a commodity not for production and marketing of
the patented products but to search for someone who may be sued for
infringement of the patent.
Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2007 A.I.R. 24759 (2013) para. 156. But see Rai, supra note
148, at 423-24 (arguing IPR protection is relevant in technologically strong industries and that
there is a positive relation between the strength of an IPR regime and FDI decisions).
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industrialization. In fact, anything we could say about causality is simply
hypothetical and conjectural. 73 After all, the fact that both patent protection
and industrial development occurred at the same time does not necessarily
support the contention that that patent protection was instrumental in creating
industrial development or that development had an impact on patent
protection. 17 4
The contemporary examples examined in the previous section from Italy,
China, and India are further corroborated by a study of periods during which
the Netherlands (1869-1912) and Switzerland (1850-1907) had no patent
protection. This study further undermines the view that patents played an
unambiguous role as an incentive for innovation and industrialization.1 75
This study demonstrates that industrial growth in the Netherlands in the
patent period was relatively moderate and importantly not any much higher
in the non-patent period. 176 In short, this evidence from the Netherlands and
Switzerland in their non-patent periods undermines claims that there is a
causal connection between the existence of a patent system and the pace of
industrialization. 77
If it is in fact true that the lack of patents did not depress growth in
Switzerland and the Netherlands during the non-patent periods, and that
growth instead accelerated (though there was decline in some sectors during
the non-patent period), how could we really justify extending strong IP
regimes in LDCs today? The crucial question is whether it is plausible to
argue that less protection of lPRs in a LDC will result in less investment,
especially if the share of sales of IP-protected goods in such LDCs is
miniscule as a share of global sales. 78
173 ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: NETHERLANDS,

1869-

1912, SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907, at 8 (1971).
174 Id. at 122.
175 Id. at 51, 112, 123-24.
176 Id at 67-68.
177 Id at 14. Notably, in the nineteenth century, the U.S. refused to provide copyright
protection particularly to English authors, and in essence was regarded as a notorious pirate.
Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation

and Settlement, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 267, 286 (2004). In fact, many developed economies
were not strong protectors of IP rights in the early days of their industrial development. HAJOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY

THE LADDER:

DEVELOPMENT

STRATEGY

IN

HISTORJCAL

PERSPECTIVE 57-58 (2002).
"1 For example, we know that sales of pharmaceutical products in Africa as a percentage of
global sales is less than two percent. See Susan Warner, The Quandary For Drug Giants
Amid Aids Epidemic, PHILLY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2001), http://articles.philly.com/2001-03-06/new

s/253 27564 I aids-drugs-azt-combivir.
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In my view, the foregoing evidence makes it plausible to question the
adoption or imposition of strong IP regimes in LDCs while still supporting
strengthened IP protection in developed and middle-income countries where
there is stronger evidence to show strong causal links between economic
growth and increases in productivity." 9
In his study of the economics of patents, E.T. Penrose noted that:
Any country must lose if it grants monopoly privileges in the
domestic market which neither improve nor cheapen the goods
available, develop its own productive capacity nor obtain for its
producers at least equivalent privileges in other markets. No
amount of talk about the "economic unity of the world: can
hide the fact that some countries with little export trade in
industrial goods and few, if any inventions for sale having
nothing to gain from granting patents on inventions worked and
patented abroad except the avoidance of unpleasant foreign
retaliation in other directions.!so
This economic truism was written in 1951, prior to the adoption of many
international IP treaties. Today, we have the TRIPS Agreement, which
makes the globalization of a strong regime of IP rights inevitable for all
countries except LDCs-which have until July 1, 2021 to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement, and until 2016 to fully protect pharmaceutical patents.
V. LDC VIEWS ON PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY

It is important to examine exactly what kind of IP protection LDCs
desire. At the Sixth LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting held in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania in October 2009, the final communiqu6 devoted only six of its
eighty-four paragraphs to IP rights. None of these six paragraphs called for
strengthening IP protection."' The Fifth LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting in
1" See generally Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual PropertyRights and Economic DevelopmentHistoricalLessons andEmerging Issues (2001).
180 PENROSE, supra note 3, at 116-17.
181 See Sixth LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting, Dar es Salaam Declaration, WT/MIN(09)/2
(Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/official
doc e.htm. Two paragraphs focused on traditional knowledge and benefit sharing arising
from the exploitation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge from LDCs. Id. IT 4647. Two paragraphs focused on effective technology transfer from developed countries to
LDCs to help them create a viable technological base. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. Finally, one paragraph
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Maseru, Lesotho also devoted six of its seventy-four paragraphs to IP rights,
yet none of these paragraphs called for strengthening IP rights protection.
Instead, like in the 2009 Dar es Salaam meeting, LDCs at the Maseru
meeting focused on issues of traditional knowledge, benefit sharing in the
exploitation of their genetic resources, traditional knowledge and importantly
on effective technology transfer from developed countries to enable them to
create a viable industrial base.182
In fact, it is fair to say that implementing the TRIPS Agreement as
currently written has not been as major a concern for LDCs as it has been for
developed economies and their firms. Instead, as evidenced by the IPoA,
LDCs have worked with other countries to successfully lobby to have the
TRIPS Agreement limited. These countries have lobbied to have the TRIPS
Agreement be read to not preclude access to life saving medicines for those
suffering with HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Additionally, these
countries have lobbied for better benefit sharing schemes for their natural
resources as well as the recognition of their traditional knowledge. Finally,
LDCs have sought to put in place a mechanism under Article 66(6) of the
TRIPS Agreement, to ensure that developed countries meet their obligations
to promote and encourage technology transfer in an effort to create a viable
technological base.1 83

LDCs see the role of IPRs and FDI as helping them to develop a
technological base so that they are able to diversify their exports. In fact, the
IPoA identifies increasing productive capacities as one of the first priority
areas for LDCs to the year 2020.184 LDCs are lagging behind in science,
technology and innovation, yet these areas are "key drivers for
transformation and have great potentials to change the development
landscape of least developed countries if developed and harnessed
properly." 85 Some of the strategies to achieve these goals for developed
country partners include "mutually beneficial investment agreements,"
encouraging investment in LDCs through a variety of lending instruments as
focused on seeking financial and technical assistance to help LDCs implement their TRIPS
obligations. Id 150.
132 See LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting, Maseru Declaration,WT/L/719 (March 14, 2008).
For an extensive examination of the concerns of African countries in the international IP
regime, see TSHIMANGA KONGOLO, AFRICAN CONTRIBUTIONS IN SHAPING WORLDWIDE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM (2013).
183 2011-2020 Programme of Action, supra note 28, ¶¶ 40-41.
184 Id ¶ 42 (noting that this includes infrastructure, energy, science, technology and

innovation as well as private sector development).
Iss Request for an Extension, supra note 10, $ 3.
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well as business development services and strengthening technology transfer
programs under "mutually agreed terms by fostering linkages between
foreign and domestic firms."l86
Finally, as I noted at the beginning of this Article, in November 2012,
LDCs applied for the extension of their obligation to implement the TRIPS
Agreement, which was granted. The application for extension argued that
until LDCs have developed productive capacities and graduated out of their
LDC status, they should not be required to implement the TRIPS
These countries made the argument that being required to
Agreement.'
protect IP rights would prevent them from developing a technological base in
their economies. The arguments made by LDCs are consistent with those of
leading academics who have argued that patent protections in particular are
only significant for economic growth when a country has reached a high
threshold of development.18 8

Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides LDCs with extensions to
the periods within which they must implement their TRIPS Agreement
obligations due to their economic, financial, and administrative constraints;
as well as the need to develop a technology base. As noted earlier, the
Marrakesh Agreement similarly acknowledges the impediments LDCs face
The
in implementing trade agreements and their need for flexibility.'18

186 UN-OHRLLS, THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THINGS To KNow, THINGS TO Do 32

(2012), available at http://www.unohrils.orgfUserFiles/File/LATEST/`2OPoA.pdf. See also
2011-2020 Programme of Action, supra note 28, TT 88-91.
1" See Request for Extension, supra note 10, ¶ 11. See also Frederick M. Abbott, INT'L
CEN. FOR TRADE AND Sus. DEV., Technical Note: The LDC TRIPS Transition Extension and
the Question of Rollback 8-9 (POLICY BRIEF No. 15, 2013), available at http://www.ic
tsd.org/themes/innovation-and-ip/research/technical-note-the-ldc-trips-transition-extensionand-the-question (noting the institutional capacity argument of LDCs has substantial merit and
does not imply these countries are entirely "avoiding the implementation of TRIPScompatible IP systems" or that it will lead to a reduced respect for IP obligations").
.ss See Keith Maskus & Jerome Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods
and the Privatizationof Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 298 (2004). See also Yee
Kyoung Kim et al., Appropriate Intellectual Property Protection and Economic Growth in
Countries at Different Levels ofDevelopment, 41 RES. POL'Y 359 (2012); Kristie Briggs, Does
Patent Harmonization Impact the Decision of Volume of High Technology Trade?, 25 IREF
35-51 (2012).
1" Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 19, art. XI, ¶ 2 ("The least-developed countries
recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade
needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities."). See also Ruth L. Okediji, Public
Welfare and the InternationalPatent System, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Ruth
L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014) (arguing that patent harmonization must take into
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Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement also recognizes the need for LDCs to
have flexibility in their implementation of trade agreements to help them
"create a sound and viable technological base."' 90
In the 2005 extension of the transition period for LDC implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement, LDCs were required to ensure that during the
additional transition period, they would not provide lower levels of IPR
protection than those in the TRIPS Agreement.191 LDCs did not want to
carry forward this stay-put provision in the 2012 extension application since
a primary justification for the second extension was that LDCs needed an
extended period of time to develop technological and other capacities for
transformation of their economies. While LDCs, civil society groups,' 92 and
academics1 93 sought to have no conditions imposed on a new indefinite
extension, some developed countries like those in the European Union and
the U.S. were considering a highly conditional extension that would commit
LDCs to take steps to comply with IP rights.' 94 The United States and
European Union insisted on the desirability of having a provision to prevent
rollbacks of current IP laws in LDCs as well as a needs assessment to
establish LDC needs so that assistance to implement the TRIPS Agreement
can be provided.' 95 A "non-rollback" commitment was of significance
because more than half of all LDCs have enacted or amended their IP laws in
the areas of patents, copyrights, and trademarks since 1995.196 However, the
2013 decision by the Council for TRIPS to extend the transition period did
account local needs and the administration of the patent system must reflect the
socioeconomic realities of the protecting country).
190 TRIPS Agreement. supra note 36, art. XI, 12 ("The least-developed countries recognized
as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade
needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities."). See also Okediji, supra note 189
(arguing that patent harmonization must take into account local needs and the administration
of the patent system must reflect the socioeconomic realities of the protecting country).
19 Extension Decision, supra note 11, ¶ 5.
192 Letter from Civil Society to the Members of the WTO Concerning a Further Extension of
the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (Feb. 21, 2013), available
at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/LDC-extension-letter.pdf.
193 Letter from Global Academics' Expert on LDCs' TRIPs Extension Request
(Apr. 27,
2013), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Global-AcademicsC2
%B9-Expert-Letter-on-LDC-Extension.pdf.
194 WTO: US and EU Demand TRIPS Plus Concession From Poorest Countries, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2013/twninfol30407.
htm.
195 Id.
196 See infra APPENDIX Two.
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not include "non-rollback." Rather is included a new compromise, which
stated "[r]ecognizing the progress that least developed country Members
have already made towards implementing the TRIPS Agreement, including
in accordance with paragraph 5 of IP/C/40, least developed country Members
express their determination to preserve and continue the progress towards
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement."'
VI. CONCLUSION

In this Paper, I have tried to demonstrate that the history of extending
strong IP protection-with a particular focus on patents-in least-developed
economies is unlikely to yield the positive economic benefits of stronger FDI
flows or higher growth. LDCs face a challenge. One the one hand, weak
protection of IP rights-like that offered by China-provides space for
innovative activity because there is accessibility of knowledge goods that are
not encumbered by lIP protection. However, the availability of knowledge
goods in the public sphere means that technology transfers may be
discouraged because IP holders, especially in R&D intensive fields like
pharmaceuticals, may fear that low levels of IP protection make it easy for
their innovations to be to copied and mimicked. Investors may fear that
innovations from new research and development efforts would not be
protected under a regime of low IP protection. By contrast, as this Article
explored, strong lIP regimes have other consequences-not least of which is a
diversion of resources from other critical needs such as access to essential
medicines that may very well be necessary to enable LDCs to fully protect IP
rights.
As such, this Paper argues that without the broad range of preconditions
for increasing FDI flows, strong IP protection in LDCs by itself is unlikely to
attract stronger flows of FDI. FDI flows continue to be weak in LDCsexcept those with rich mineral resources. The late industrializers of East
Asia did not achieve rapid and sustained economic progress simply because
they adopted strong regimes of IP. Rather, as Paul Krugman and others have
demonstrated, massive increases in inputs such as capital, technology and
"n Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Decision of the
Councilfor TRIPS, IP/C/64 (June 112, 2013), availableat https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
e/trips e/ldc e.htm. See also Extension Decision, supra note 11, 12; World Trade
Organization News, The Least Developed Get Eight Years More Leeway on Protecting
Intellectual Property (June 11-12, 2013), available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/n
ewsl3_e/trip_ I1jun13 _e.htm.
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education were much more consequential in spurring sustained exponential
growth rates.1 98
Further, these economies adopted a model of late
industrialization that was heavily supported by the government. 99 It was
these types of economic reforms, rather than merely strong IP regimes, that
were consequential in the industrialization of economies like South Korea
contrary to the free market governance prescriptions of the World Bank.200
Further, China's astonishing growth towards industrialization has
occurred largely in an era where the protection of IP rights has been less than
satisfying to foreign investors. This growth seems to further contradict the
view that strong IP protection is a prerequisite for strong flows of FDI. The
fact that China is the leading destination of FDI, while also being a leading
source of anxiety for owners of IP rights, undermines the positive correlation
between strong IP protection and strength in attracting FDI. There are
certainly many other determinants of strength attracting FDI in China,
including the massive capital investments being made in infrastructure and
manufacturing capacity. Perhaps China's growth shows that strong IP
protection is crucial for maintaining the competitive advantages of early
industrializers but may not be a crucial determinant for the emergence of
new ones.
If the question is to what extent a patent system stimulates the propensity
or eagerness to innovate, the evidence available so far does not strongly
show causal links between strong IP protection and innovation for LDCs.
On the separate issue of a correlation or causal link between strong IP
protection and strength in attracting FDI, the evidence is even weaker as we
have seen with regard to China and LDCs. FDI flows are higher in resource
conflict countries like Angola and Mozambique than in more stable
economies with relatively stronger IP protection. Furthermore, while strong
IPR protections may indeed be a factor encouraging foreign investment, the
China example demonstrates that it may not be one of the most important
considerations. For example, the vice president of a major medical products
firm interviewed in Edwin Mansfield's IFC study cited four factors that are
equally, if not more important than IPR protections, in his company's foreign
investment decisions: (1) the size of the market for the company's "key
products," (2) the preference of local customers for imported products, (3)
health care costs and reimbursement policies of the country in question, and
1"

Paul Krugman, The Myth ofAsia's Miracle, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 62 (1994).

199 AMSDEN, supra note 163.
200 NANCY M. BIRDSALL ET AL., World Bank, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: EcoNOMIC GROWTH

AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993). For a critical review, see Amsden, supra note 122, at 622.
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(4) the need to educate national leadership and customer markets on the
Clearly investors are
use/importance of the company's products.201
to IP protection or its
in
addition
of
considerations
set
interested in a broader
strength in deciding where to invest.
Claims of strong causal links between strength in attracting FDI and
strong IP regimes are not only overstated, but also underemphasize the
importance and availability of public goods like access to knowledge or
education. Perversely, knowledge and education may become increasingly
inaccessible and expensive if resources are exclusively spent strengthening
IP regimes.202 For example, lack of access to essential medicines in LDCs
demonstrates how strong IP regimes might operate to the detriment of
building the human capital necessary to address the developmental
challenges LDCs face. Yet, addressing those challenges is necessary to
attract FDI.
Over the last two decades, the largest source of controversy in this area
has been the TRIPS agreement, which binds signatory nations to adopt
Western-style IP regimes. However, it is important to recognize that even
within the TRIPS Agreement, there are built-in exceptions that allow
signatory countries a measure of flexibility in order to meet their obligations
in a manner that does not undermine arguably higher-order development
needs. 203 For example, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement allows signatories
to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socioeconomic and technological development." 2 04
Although it favors Western-style IP protections as a default, the language
of TRIPS permits poorer countries to balance the competing interests of
development with its obligations to enforce monopoly rights. This is
appropriate, considering that the very motivation behind granting IP

201

Mansfield, supra note 118, at 25.

202 See generally Heald, supra note 151, at 249; Maskus, supra note 6, at 498 (suggesting

strong IP rights might create higher local prices that could be cost prohibitive in developing
countries).
203 "[T]he basic goals safeguarded by a robust public domain-such as encouraging userbased innovation, facilitating scientific research, education and scholarship, and supporting
access to less expensive knowledge goods ... are an essential aspect of the policy balance
within intellectual property governance." Margaret Chon, Global Intellectual Property
Governance (Under Construction), 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349, 362 (2011).
204 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 8. See also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property
Equality, 9 SEATTLE J. Soc. JusT. 259, 263 (2010).
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monopolies is to incentivize innovation for the betterment of society writ
large not to merely enrich the owners of IPRs.
In addition to designing a more balanced IP regime, an LDC may also
disregard TRIPS' stringent IP standards upon demonstration of some
domestic policy imperative. Despite being infused with "formal equality,"205
the TRIPS agreement expressly permits LDCs to invoke conditions that
allow for deviation from the Treaty's obligations to treat all rights holders
equally. For instance, Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement "may provide
limited exceptions to the patentee's exclusive rights, as long as these
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner" which is often read to allow for "private noncommercial uses."2 06
Further, in order to assist LDCs needing access to life-saving patented
medications, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, as read together with the
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and subsequent developments
in the WTO on access to essential medicines, contains rules for governments
to set up "compulsory licenses" with patent owners. 207 This allows LDCs to
access essential medicines in exchange for paying "adequate remuneration"
to the rights holder or to request countries with manufacturing capacity to
produce for them. 208 In addition to flexibilities provided by the TRIPS
Agreement, donation programs are one of the ways in which people in
developing countries have been able to access essential medicines that would
otherwise be cost prohibitive. The Mectizan Donation Program-a publicprivate partnership between Merck & Co., the World Health Organization,
the World Bank, and several NGOs-is an example of a successful initiative
not driven by the classic profit-making motives of the pharmaceutical
industry. Since 1978, the Mectizan Donation Program has provided more

205 The TRIPS Agreement embodies the WTO's two principles of formal equality: (1) "most
favored nation" status, which requires non-discrimination among foreign nationals, and (2)
"national treatment," which bars favoring domestic entities over foreign entities. Denis
Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in InternationalIntellectual Property,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 71, 114.
206 Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307, 315 (2004).
207 Applicants must seek out these agreements with the rights holder on "reasonable
commercial terms" except in the case of national emergency or other extreme urgency. The
licenses are limited in scope and duration and may only be used to supply the domestic
market. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 31. See also Cotter, supra note 206, at 315.
208 Cotter, supra note 206, at 315-16.
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than one billion treatments for river blindness in thirty African countries, six
Latin American countries, and Yemen.209
Thus, LDCs obligated to TRIPS have the policy space to stake out a
middle-ground policy, which would in turn create the space to allow them to
address domestic priorities while meeting their IPR protection commitments
under TRIPS. These flexibilities not only provide much needed access to the
neediest population groups, but also expand markets served by
pharmaceutical manufacturers. For instance, Thailand's implementation of
compulsory licenses for a variety of cancer treatments not only enables
"more Thai citizens to have access to essential drugs" but also is opening a
new market for pharmaceutical companies because Thai citizens "who can
afford the retail price will continue to pay that price [to] the patent owner." 210
Under its current iteration, TRIPS allows the least developed countries until
2016 to conform their patent laws with TRIPS for pharmaceutical products
and until 2021 to comply with the TRIPS Agreement in its entirety. As the
WTO Doha Rounds of negotiation continue to proceed, LDCs should press
to allow TRIPS flexibilities to promote additional domestic development
priorities, such as facilitating the use of patented inventions by researchers. 2 11
As I noted at the beginning, another strategy LDCs are pursuing at the
moment is extending their obligation to implement the TRIPS Agreement
until they graduate from their status as an LDC. Many of the issues raised in
this paper will be debated in the discussion of the merits of this extension
application. For many LDCs, fully implementing the TRIPS Agreement
even with its flexibilities would constitute a significant strengthening of the
IP laws a majority of them have on the books. This Paper argued that there
is hardly any empirical evidence to support the need for strengthened IP
regimes in LDCs, especially if such strengthening was unaccompanied by
other initiatives to build the productive capacities of these economies. There
are significant resource and capacity constraints that limit the
implementation and enforcement of these laws in an LDC.
To justify strengthening these laws would presuppose that the high costs
that would be accompanied by enacting, implementing, and enforcing them
would be paid for by the economic benefits that would flow from these new
209 Elaisha Stokes, Merck continues campaign against river blindness in the DRC, GLOBAL

(Sept 29, 2014), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/health/140919/merck-riverblindness-drc-ppp-branding-health.
POST

210 Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1047,

1067-68 (2009).
211 Id. at 1054.
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laws. Until such benefits can be gained, strengthening IP regimes in LDCs
will continue to be regarded as a one-sided agenda of the owners of IP rights
in the industrial north. It is notable that there are joint ventures being
developed in the South-South context that are not preconditioned on
strengthening IP protection that may contribute significantly to technology
and know-how transfers.212 Such modest efforts are indications of the
possible paths that technology transfers could play for firms in LDCs like
Uganda.
Ultimately, LDCs must figure out ways in which to attract FDI flows. As
I have demonstrated throughout this Paper, the causal connection between
strengthening IP protections and attracting FDI flows is more tenuous than
once believed. Perhaps then, LDCs should invest time, energy, and money
into other methods of attracting FDI flows.

212 For example, the Indian generics drug manufacturer, Cipla, has engaged
in a "knowledge
platform" sharing arrangement with a Ugandan firm, Quality Chemicals Limited (QCL).
Previously, QCL was a local distributor of imported pharmaceuticals. Its agreement with
Cipla is facilitating its acquisition of a pharmaceutical technology capability with the training
necessary to enable it to become a generics manufacturer. BISwAIT DHAR & REJI JOSEPH,

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:

THE NORTH-SOUTH AND THE SOUTH-SOUTH DiMENSION 20 (2012).

Cipla's relationship to

QCL has enabled it to consider plans to open a second manufacturing facility that would serve
the East African market. Making Drugs Into Profit in Uganda, BBC (Apr. 9, 2012), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-I 7639822.
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APPENDIX ONE

LIST OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Lesotho
Liberia

33

Asia (14)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Cambodia
Kiribati
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Myanmar

8

#

#

*

#

*

#

#

#

#

#

*

9
10
11
12
13
14

Nepal
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Yemen

*

16
17

*

32

#

Guinea-Bissau

#

15

#

26
27
28
29
30
31

#

Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea

#

9
10
11
12
13
14

#

25

6

#

Democratic Republic of the Congo

4
5

*

8

3

Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
and
Tom6
Sao
Principe*
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Uganda
United Republic of
Tanzania
Zambia

*

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

#

7

Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros

*

Africa (33)
1
2

*

Latin America and the Caribbean (1)
1
Haiti

213 This information was gathered from List of Least Developed Countries, UN-OHRLLS
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldclist.pdf (last visited May 3, 2015).
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IP COVERAGE IN LDCs
Least Developed Country
Afghanistan

Patents
No

Copyright
Yes

Trademark
Yes

Yes

Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Chad

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Draft
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Comoros

No

Yes

Yes

No

Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia

Yes
Dra t

Yes
Yes

Yes
Draft

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
Yes
No

Guinea

No

Yes

No

NO

Guinea-Bissau

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Haiti
Kiribati
Lao Peopke's Democratic
Republic
Lesotho
Liberia

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
ys
Yes

Yes
Draft
NO

Madagascar
Malawi

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No

Mali
Mauritania

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Mozambique

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Myanmar

Drall.

Draft

Draft

Draft

Nepal

Yes

Yes

No

Niger
Rwanda

Yes
Yes

Ye's

Yes

Samoa

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Varieties

Democratic Republic of the

Draft

Yes

No

Yes

No
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SWo Tom6 and Principe

Yes

Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tuvalu
Uganda

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
42/48 =
87.5%

Yes
Yes
Yes
Ys
45/48 =
93.75%

United Republic of
Tanzania
Vanuatu

Yemen
Zambia
Totals
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Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
es
YS

No
Yes
Draft
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes

No
NO
Yes
No
18/48=
37.5%

Yes
Yes
Yes
4 4/48=
9 1.66%

2016]

553

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
APPENDIX THREE

Country
Afghanistan
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Democratic Republic of the
Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Kiribati
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Niger
Rwanda
Samoa

Patents
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

I Qs$
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
NO
NO
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Nvo

-

IP LAWS PASSED BY LDCs SINCE 1995

554
Sio Tom6 and Principe

No

Yes

yes
No
No
No
yes
Yes,

YesY
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

No
27/48 =
%56.25

No
28/48 =
%58.33

25/48 =
%52.08

Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Timor-Leste

Yes
No
No
No.
No
No

Togo
Tuvalu
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Vanuatu
Yemen
Zambia
Totals
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No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
31/48 =
%64.58

